ABSTRACT: I describe a naïve-realist conception of perceptual knowledge, which faces a challenge from the idea that normal perceivers and brains-in-vats have equally justified perceptual beliefs. I defend the naïve-realist position from Nicholas Silins’ recent version of this challenge. I argue that Silins’ main objection fails, and that the naïve-realist understanding of perceptual knowledge can be reconciled with the idea that brains-in-vats have justified perceptual beliefs.

Naive realists argue that our conscious experiences in cases of seeing involve relational links to items in the world. This view about the metaphysics of experience is naturally paired with the idea that perceptual knowledge rests on this sort of conscious relational link to a perceived object. But this idea about perceptual knowledge may be hard to reconcile with the familiar thought that brain-in-a-vat subjects and normal perceivers are equally justified in their perceptual beliefs. In a recent paper (2005), Nicholas Silins deploys the latter thought in perspicuous and extensive arguments against externalists about evidence. Although this line against externalism about evidence is fairly common, I believe that Silins has provided the most substantial elaboration of it. In this paper I reply to Silins’ arguments from a naïve-realist perspective.

Section 1

Here is a simple, familiar definition of naïve realism about veridical experiences:

**NR** In a case of a subject S accurately seeing an object O, S’s visual experience (his conscious, subjective experiential state) consists in a relation of awareness to O and O’s perceptible properties. The experience has a world-involving nature in that an external item is part of its structure. The relational nature of S’s experience has modal consequences. Since O and its perceptible properties are parts of the structure of S’s experience, S could not have that experience unless he were seeing O and these properties.

This theory departs from traditional ‘common-factor’ accounts in two related ways. First, naïve realists build the relational, success-entailing features that all philosophers attribute to the condition of seeing an object into the structure of veridical experience itself. Naive realists say that our conscious visual states in good cases are success-entailing states. Second, coupled with standard assumptions about hallucinations, the naïve view of veridical experience entails that veridical conscious states and hallucinatory conscious states are importantly not the same. Whatever we say about hallucinations, we are not going to analyze them along the preceding world-involving, relational lines. Naive realists say that veridical and hallucinatory experiences differ in their basic metaphysical structure.
As introduced, naive realism is a theory about the metaphysics of visual experience. We can put this theory to work in epistemology by claiming that the relational success states posited by naive realism are the conscious experiential grounds of perceptual belief in cases of seeing.

Take a standard case of perceptual knowledge. In good circumstances, I see a red ball, and, on the basis of my experience of the ball, I judge of the ball that it is red. Since the ball and its red colour are constituents of my experience, my judgment has what I will call an *entailing experiential ground*. Although my experience is not a propositional attitude, its existence entails that the perceptual belief that I form on its basis is true. The notion of an entailing experiential ground can also be elaborated in a slightly different manner. We can think of my experience of the red ball as having a privileged and potentially explanatory association with a particular proposition—the proposition that I have an experience that relates me to the ball and its red colour. Again, this proposition entails that my belief that the ball is red is true. Naïve realism tells us that typical perceptual beliefs have grounds which are (i) subjective and (ii) relational success states which entail the truth of these beliefs.

These claims represent the naive realist’s attempt to understand perceptual knowledge.

**NRK** Instances of perceptual knowledge should be understood and explained partly in terms of subjects basing their beliefs on entailing experiential grounds.

I will come back to this claim at the end of the paper. Here first are some preliminary remarks on it. The idea that perceptual beliefs have entailing experiential grounds clashes with epistemological tradition. However, several philosophers have argued that this idea supports distinctively appealing responses to scepticism.¹ In addition, I believe that the naïve conception of experiential grounds can contribute to discussions of the epistemic significance of disagreement and opposing testimony.

In the current paper, however, my aims are expository and defensive. On behalf of NRK, I am going to reply to Silins’ arguments, in part by filling out the NRK position in a manner that avoids Silins’ objections. Although the position I will develop includes some controversial claims, I will not provide starting-line motivations for the package.² Since Silins

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¹ See, e.g., McDowell 1982, Johnston 2006; see also Michael Martin’s discussion of Humean scepticism in his 2006.
² For defenses of metaphysical naïve realism, see, e.g., Martin 2004, 2006; Kennedy 2009, forthcoming-a, forthcoming-b.
aims to assess the consequences of externalism about evidence, an emphasis on clarification of the naïve-realist position is appropriate.

Section 2
Silins’ central line of thought is that externalists about evidence are committed to the claim that internal twins are not equally justified in their beliefs, and that this commitment is highly problematic.

In his *Sense and Sensibilia*, J.L. Austin makes a well known complaint about the descriptive adequacy of the notion of evidence as applied to cases of perceptual knowledge (Austin 1962, pp. 115-116; this is the example involving buckets of pig food, and the pig coming into view). Although I am sympathetic to this complaint, I don’t want to object to the terms of our current debate in such a categorical manner; so I will try to state naïve realism’s epistemological claims in terms of the notions of evidence and justification.

Consider two subjects, Gary and Barry. Gary is a normal subject who perceives a banana. Gary is in a so-called Good case. For present purposes, **Good experiential cases** (‘Good cases’) have two features: first, subjects in these cases see an object; and second, these subjects have perceptual knowledge of the objects that they see.

Barry is an internal twin of Gary who is a **brain in a vat**. Barry has a ‘matching’ hallucination as of a banana and is in a so-called Bad case. **Bad experiential cases** (‘Bad cases’) exclude both seeing and knowledge. Bad experiential cases have one further feature. Subjects in Bad cases cannot know via first-person means that they are not in a Good case (compare Williamson 2000, p. 165). All brains-in-vats are ‘bad-case’ subjects, but not all bad-case subjects are brains-in-vats.

Both of our local protagonists, Gary and Barry, believe that there is a banana in front of them. On my naïve-realist view, Gary has experiential evidence which entails that his belief is true. (In order to secure this point, we need to think of Gary’s experience as somehow including the location of the banana. I think most opponents would allow the naïve realist the ability to do this). Barry is hallucinating and does not have entailing experiential evidence for his belief. Gary and Barry are internal twins who do not have identical bodies of evidence.

With these claims, I reject Evidential Internalism:

**Evidential Internalism** Necessarily, if A and B are internal twins, then A and B have the same evidence. (Silins 2005, p. 376)
By rejecting Evidential Internalism, I accept **Evidential Externalism**, which is just the negation of the preceding Internalist view. Since the key topic for naïve realists is the nature of our subjective, conscious states, an ‘externalist’ label is in some ways inappropriate. But the theory meets the definition of Evidential Externalism that Silins supplies in his paper.

Silins’ line of attack against Evidential Externalism attributes a further commitment to the view, and argues that this further commitment is problematic. This further commitment is **opposition to** the following thesis:

**Equal Justification** Necessarily, if A and B are internal twins, then A is justified to degree n1 in believing P to degree n2 just in case B is justified to degree n1 in believing P to degree n2. (Silins 2005, p. 385)

It’s a common thought in epistemology that internal twins are equally justified in their beliefs. However, we might wonder what this thought has to do with the evidential externalist. We might think that evidence is one thing, and justification is another. Why must the externalist about evidence reject Equal Justification?

Silins suggests that if the externalist accepts Equal Justification, then the differences in evidence that this theorist insists on are ‘epistemically idle’ (p. 386; see also the surrounding text). Perhaps the naïve realist’s ambition to understand perceptual knowledge in terms of subjects’ having entailing experiential evidence is endangered if the possession of such evidence does not provide more justification to a perceiver’s belief than the justification available in a counterpart Bad case. This is a prima facie credible suggestion, although it’s also worth a careful look. We’ll come back to the perils of accepting Equal Justification when this issue arises for us in concrete form. For now I will assume that the Evidential Externalist has some interest in rejecting Equal Justification.

To get Silins’ arguments into view we will need to introduce some conceptual and semi-technical apparatus.

Many philosophers distinguish between propositional justification and doxastic justification. These concepts attribute very different properties to agents, so it is worth getting clear on these concepts. I will work with William Alston’s recent definitions of them, which are conventional:

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3 For an influential statement of this thought, see Cohen 1984. Equal-justification ideas play an important role in debates between various forms of internalism and externalism about epistemic justification (for discussion, see, e.g., Neta and Pritchard 2007). I discuss epistemic justification in later sections of this paper. But my main aim is to defend a naïve-realist understanding of perceptual knowledge from Silins’ challenge to externalists about evidence.
**Propositional justification:** ‘A proposition, P, may be said to be justified for S provided S is so situated that if he were to make use of that situation to form a belief that P, that belief would be justified. (S can be justified vis-à-vis P in this sense even if [S] does not have a justified belief that P. It is just that in attributing justification in this sense to S one is leaving it open whether S has a belief that P’. (Alston 2005, p. 18)

**Doxastic justification:** ‘In the doxastic sense one is justified in believing that P provided one has a belief that P which is justified’. (Alston, p. 18)

Justification of both types comes in degrees. But we also speak of justification, fairly often, as an on-off notion, describing someone’s belief as ‘justified’ or ‘not justified’. Accordingly, focusing on doxastic justification, there are two ways in which justification can be ascribed to a subject’s belief. We can assign some degree of justification to the belief. Or we can simply say that the belief is justified, flat-out. So we need to distinguish between a graded or degree-theoretic notion of justification and an ‘outright’ notion of justification. This distinction between the graded and the outright combines with the propositional/doxastic distinction to yield two senses of propositional justification, and two senses of doxastic justification.

We can state ‘Equal Justification’ theses about internal twins in terms of each of these four senses of justification. The following versions of Equal Justification are intended to have the same modal and quantificational force as Silins’ above thesis, but I will leave much of this implicit in order to improve readability.

**Graded (or Degree-theoretic) Propositional Justification (GPJ)**
For all propositions p, internal twins’ situations confer the same degrees of justification on these propositions.

**Graded (or Degree-theoretic) Doxastic Justification (GDJ)**
Internal twins’ beliefs are justified to the same degree.

**Outright Propositional Justification (OPJ)**
Internal twins’ situations confer outright justification on the same propositions.

**Outright Doxastic Justification (ODJ)**
Internal twins do not differ in their outright justified beliefs.

Silins accepts all four claims about internal twins. Silins expects the Evidential Externalist to reject all four claims. Silins contends that all four claims are very intuitive, and that the externalist incurs significant intuitive opposition by rejecting them (pp. 385-386).
Silins thinks that the Equal Justification account of internal twins is especially appealing when we consider specific hypothetical pairings of internal twins (ibid). For instance, our protagonists, Gary and Barry, are internal twins who each believe that there is a banana in front of them. They believe this on the basis of qualitatively matching experiences. When we consider Gary and Barry’s beliefs, and the circumstances of the formation of these beliefs, the above Equal Justification claims should seem intuitively appealing to us.4

As part of his appeal to intuition, Silins argues that externalists are committed to especially bad violations of the Graded Doxastic Justification version of the Equal Justification thesis—the thesis concerning degrees of doxastic justification. Here the idea is not simply that Evidential Externalism rejects GDP. Rather, Silins argues that Evidential Externalism leads to specific violations of GDP which are more or less unpalatable. This is the headline contention in Silins’ paper; this is the charge on which he puts the most weight (see pp. 376, 384-385, 387, 390). We can go a long way towards rescuing naive realism in this encounter by rebutting this charge.

The advertised disaster is that the externalist’s conception of evidence entails the existence of scenarios in which a Good-case subject’s belief is less doxastically justified than the counterpart belief of the Bad-case subject. However, ‘the consequence that one is sometimes more justified in the bad case is one that should be unwelcome to all’ (p. 390).

Silins’ argument makes use of the notion of evidential probability—of a proposition’s probability on a subject’s evidence. Silins does not say much about evidential probability; I will make some framing remarks for my own discussion later in this section.

The unpalatable consequence that Silins attributes to externalism about evidence is produced by combining this view about evidence with (a) two assumptions about the relationship between evidential probability and degree-theoretic doxastic justification, and (b) some other ideas that we will encounter in due course.

I will argue that the most viable, coherent development of the naive-realist conception of perceptual evidence rejects key parts of this additional apparatus and is able to avoid the unpalatable consequence in this manner.

4 Silins also makes a separate argument for the Outright versions of the Equal Justification thesis (pp. 392-393). Since I accept these versions of the thesis (see sections 6 and 7 of the present paper), we won’t need to consider this argument. In an earlier part of his paper, Silins develops an argument against Evidential Externalism that turns on the notion of ‘armchair knowledge’. Since Silins does not regard this argument as especially threatening (pp. 383-384), I will leave it out of the present discussion.
Say that both evidential probabilities and degrees of confidence take decimal values on a scale from 0 to 1. Silins’ two assumptions are as follows.

**Assumption 1** ‘If the probability of P on one’s evidence is n, then one’s degree of confidence in P ought to be n’. (p. 387)

**Assumption 2** ‘If one’s degree of confidence ought to be n, and one’s actual degree of confidence diverges from n, then one’s actual degree of confidence is less than fully justified insofar as it diverges from what it ought to be’. (ibid)

Silins says that his objection can be developed without these assumptions, but first let’s see how things go when the assumptions are in place.

Assumptions 1 and 2 promote the idea that a belief’s degree of conformity to its evidential probability determines the belief’s degree of epistemic justification. Although Silins intends something more nuanced (see p. 387), the preceding idea captures the mechanics of his argument against Evidential Externalism. I will accept this probability-driven approach to doxastic justification for the purpose of replying to Silins’ claim that externalism about evidence entails that bad-case beliefs are sometimes more justified than good-case beliefs. In later sections, in my discussion of outright epistemic justification, I will recommend a more complex approach to doxastic justification, one that is sensitive to a broader range of factors.

We are interested in the degrees of doxastic justification possessed by ‘internal twins’. Internal twins are subjects who are exactly alike in all internal dimensions. Here are some additions and clarifications (compare Silins 2005; see also note 7 of the present paper). Internal twins have qualitatively identical conscious experiences. I will liberally assume that internal twins can cognitively entertain the same propositions. (Here I am simply ignoring content externalism rather than indicating any sort of challenge to it). Furthermore, internal twins have the same internal cognitive economy: they base the same beliefs on the same grounds, or at least on isomorphic grounds. And they have the same degrees of confidence in the same propositions.

Silins’ example is one in which Gary and Barry both believe, on memorial grounds, that they had a banana with breakfast yesterday. Silins works with a form of Evidential Externalism which says that a proposition P is part of one’s evidence just in case one bears a privileged factive attitude to P (see Silins 2005, pp. 378, 400 n. 11). In the next section, we will see that my form of naïve realism does not accept this connection between evidence and
privileged factive attitudes (such as knowledge). Nonetheless, I accept Evidential Externalism as Silins defines it, as the negation of Evidential Internalism.

In the breakfast example, Gary knows that he had a banana with breakfast yesterday (p. 389). It is easy enough to apply the preceding ‘factive attitude’ idea about evidence to Gary, and to assume that the probability of the Gary-relevant proposition on Gary’s good-case evidence is 1.0.

What about Barry, the bad-case subject? Barry’s evidence is a proposition to the effect that he seems to remember that he had a banana with breakfast yesterday (p. 389). In Silins’ example, this evidence confers probability .9 on Barry’s belief. This attribution of evidential probability seems somewhat generous; I will develop a similar suggestion in connection with a perceptual example.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Memory</th>
<th>Degree of Confidence</th>
<th>Probability on Total Evidence</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gary</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Barry</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>.9</td>
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(I will refer to this example as the ‘Memory’ example).

Turning to degrees of confidence, Gary and Barry’s shared degree of confidence is .9. Both subjects draw on normal caution about the reliability of their memory (p. 389). In this example, Gary’s degree of confidence is farther away from his evidential probability. For this reason, applying Assumptions 1 and 2, Barry’s belief enjoys a greater degree of justification.

We will need to convert this example into a perceptual one in order to evaluate naive realism. But before that I want to voice a reaction to Silins’ example on behalf of Evidential Externalism in general. The reaction is that this example does not reveal a disaster. Gary gets a lower score than Barry on the measure of graded doxastic justification. But it is clear from Silins’ discussion that even though Gary gets a lower score on this scale, his belief still counts as knowledge (p. 389). It is also clear that Gary’s degree of doxastic justification is compatible with his belief enjoying outright doxastic justification (p. 387). The problem Silins poses is compatible with Gary’s getting an epistemic report card which is overall very positive. Although Gary is lower than Barry on one measure, Gary still seems to do much better than Barry overall: Gary’s belief is true, he has more propositional justification (measured in terms of evidential probability) than Barry, and Gary’s belief is knowledge.

For these reasons, Evidential Externalism cannot be accused of inverting the true order of Good and Bad. The outcome is smaller-scale and more innocuous. The example
shows that Evidential Externalism combines with Assumptions 1 and 2 in a manner that places certain determinate Bad subjects ahead of certain determinate Good subjects along a single very specific, and importantly limited, dimension of epistemic evaluation. There are a large number of epistemic concepts in play in our discussion, which as a body point towards a large number of different dimensions of epistemic evaluation.\(^\text{5}\) It’s not surprising that one of these epistemic concepts, when coupled with additional assumptions, favours some Bad subjects over some Good ones. This is not a basis for outrage or alarm.

That’s one response available to Evidential Externalists. My discussion of the argument on behalf of naive realism will proceed along different lines. For this phase of the discussion, we accept Silins’ idea that Good-case subjects should not receive lower scores on the measure of graded doxastic-justification. To move forward we need to get clear on the machinery of evidential probability, and then on the experiential inputs that the naive realist will feed in to this machinery.

Following Timothy Williamson (2000), I take a proposition’s evidential probability to be its probability conditional on one’s total evidence. At least for present purposes, a subject’s total evidence at a time consists of a set of propositions. So the evidential probability of a proposition \(p\) relative to a body of total evidence is the conditional probability of \(p\) on the propositions in the evidence set. Conditional probability is determined in the standard manner (assuming \(P(E)\) is non-zero): \(P(H|E) = P(H \& E)/P(E)\).

But what notion of probability is in play in our discussion? I will follow Williamson again and assume an initial probability distribution \(P\) over all propositions. ‘\(P\) measures something like the intrinsic plausibility of hypotheses prior to investigation; this notion of intrinsic plausibility can vary in extension between contexts’ (Williamson 2000, p. 211). Williamson is quite aware that \(P\) is a vague measure. But this is a cost of doing business in terms of the notion of evidential probability. In the present discussion we will only need to assign a handful of conditional probabilities, all of which can be given fairly clear rationales.

Our current probabilistic framework requires a propositional view of the ontology of evidence. Although I am not wedded to this sort of view, I will represent our experiential evidence in propositional form in order to engage Silins’ claims about evidential probability. Starting with the Good case, I will say that if I see a banana, then my total evidence at the time includes a proposition that specifies that I am seeing a banana and certain of its

\(^{5}\) Alston (2005) extensively develops the theme that there are many dimensions of epistemic evaluation.
characteristics. A proposition of this type captures the relational link that naïve realists attribute to veridical experience itself, and for this reason it is a good representation of a subject’s experiential evidence in a Good case. An introductory statement of my policy on experiential evidence is that I will treat propositions that accurately characterize a subject’s current experience as part of his total evidence.

If we fill out the proposition that I see a banana in an appropriate manner, it will entail my belief that there is a banana in front of me. In a Good case, the probability of this belief on my total evidence will be 1.0.

Take a Bad case in which I have an experience as of a banana but fail to see one. In this case the proposition that I see a banana will not be part of my evidence, because it does not accurately capture the nature of my experience. Therefore I do not share evidence across the two cases, and commitment to Evidential Externalism is preserved.

I will aim to avoid the extension of the Memory result to the naïve realist theory. I will argue that from the perspective of this theory, the assignment of evidential probability .9 to a Bad-case subject’s perceptual belief is much too high. To begin we need to identify the propositions that form the experiential component of a subject’s evidence in Bad cases. And we need to determine the results of feeding these propositions into the machinery of evidential probability.

Hawthorne and Kovakovich observe that ‘When we report upon perceptual experience, certain descriptions encode perceptual success. Other descriptions are neutral with respect to success. Yet others encode failure’ (2006, p. 145). We are currently asking what descriptions of perceptual experience we should use in our statements of a particular subject’s experiential evidence. We have seen that naïve realists take a ‘success’ approach to ascriptions of evidence in Good cases: they hold that propositions of the form I see a banana... record a subject’s experiential evidence in these cases. This approach returns the result that typical Good-case perceptual beliefs have evidential probability 1.0.

Turning to the Bad case, subjects in this broad predicament are subjects who are hallucinating or, perhaps more generally, subjects who are not in any actual experiential contact with the world. My view is that this lack of contact should figure explicitly in our statements of a Bad-case subject’s experiential evidence. When stating this evidence, we should use a description of experience which encodes failure. A Bad-case subject’s visual experience should be fed into the machinery of evidential probability with a failure-tag on it.
Suppose that I hallucinate as of a banana. That very description of my experience is
the one that provides the official characterization of my experiential evidence:

(H) …that I am hallucinating as of a banana.

With this stance, I depart quite clearly from the idea that subjects have perfect access to the
color of their evidence. (This idea is of course also rejected in Williamson 2000). A
subject can be wrong about whether or not he is hallucinating. For this reason, a subject can
be wrong about whether the above proposition states his experiential evidence, and so
whether the above proposition is part of his evidence.

In fact, our account of Good experiential evidence already departs from the idea that
subjects have perfect access to their evidence, for one is also fallible about whether or not one
is seeing. But the point is bound to be starker as applied to a subject’s evidence in a
hallucinatory case.

Out of context, my proposal about a hallucinating subject’s evidence seems to suggest
that this subject is in command of the fact that he is hallucinating. However, this is not a
connotation of the notion of evidence that I’m respecting. In addition to rejecting perfect
access, for present purposes I also reject the Williamsonian idea that a proposition is part of
one’s evidence only if one knows that proposition. (My opposition to this idea applies to
cases of seeing as well). A proposition can be part of a subject’s evidence even if the subject
does not know the proposition.6

Another gloss on evidence is that one’s evidence is ‘what one has to go on’ (cf. Kelly
2008, p. 942). I accept this idea, but I put a somewhat uncooperative spin on it. What I have
to go on in the envisioned scenario is a hallucination as of a banana.

Although it may be a somewhat novel proposal, (H) connect with a familiar
conception of evidence. (H) states the character of a basic epistemic resource, the subject’s

6 A related reaction might be that my view allows hallucinating subjects to have perceptual knowledge that they
are hallucinating. Apparently, subjects can achieve this knowledge simply by exploiting their experiential
evidence (e.g., (H)). However, focusing on Bad experiential cases as defined in section 2, the prospect of
perceptual knowledge of hallucination is ruled out by other features of Bad cases. Subjects in Bad experiential
cases cannot acquire first-person knowledge that they are not in a Good case. Perceptual knowledge of (H)
would more or less amount to such knowledge. Thus, having knowledge of (H) on perceptual grounds is not
consistent with one’s status as a Bad-case subject. Moreover, acquiring perceptual knowledge of (H) is not a
possible way for a subject to exit a Bad case. The adjustment that I propose to traditional conceptions of
evidence is that there are some possible situations, namely Bad experiential cases, whose character prevents
first-person knowledge of salient parts of one’s evidence. (For similar ideas, see section 5; compare also
Williamson 2000, pp. 165). When we talk about Bad experiential cases, we attribute some epistemic opacity to a
subject’s visual experience; I extend this opacity to the subject’s experiential evidence.
current visual experience. The other anchor of my view is the idea that evidence is that which forms the basis of evidential probabilities. I think the most promising naïve-realist view on this topic is that the relevant descriptions of Bad experience encode failure. The thought is that for central epistemological purposes, Bad experiences are indeed Bad experiences.

Section 3

Obviously this view of evidence has the potential to generate large differences in evidential probability between Good and Bad experiential cases. Before turning to that, let’s go through some of the background paperwork. Say that our eligible ‘neutral’ description is that one has an experience as of a banana. Contrasting success and failure descriptions are that one sees a banana, and that one hallucinates as of a banana. It seems to me that when we use neutral descriptions of experience in a theoretical setting, a main purpose of this choice of terminology is to downplay the importance of the issue of veridicality with respect to the theoretical question at hand. Any ‘perception-independent’ elements of experience are in turn promoted as the main theoretical resource or vehicle of understanding. Naïve realists resist this manoeuvre with respect to the nature of our experiential states in Good cases. They think that this topic cannot be properly understood in terms of neutral notions. And the epistemologically-minded naïve realism of this paper takes a parallel stance on the topic of one’s experiential evidence in the Good case.

A neutral account of Bad experiential evidence would clash with the apparently central naïve idea that neutral notions lack descriptive primacy. More acutely, with a success account of Good experiential evidence in place, it is doubtful that a neutral account of Bad experiential evidence is a workable option for naïve realism. Within a larger naïve-realist theory, the attribution of a ‘neutral’ label to Bad experiential evidence will distinguish this evidence from Good experiential evidence, which is characterized in terms of success. As a result, in a naïve-realist setting, ‘neutral’ characterizations of evidence are not actually neutral regarding the veridicality of the evidence in question, because these characterizations are reserved for one’s evidence in Bad cases. Since neutral characterizations of evidence will encode failure anyway, a failure account of Bad experiential evidence is the most straightforward way for the naïve realist to proceed.

Take a Good-case subject who sees a banana, and a Bad-case subject who hallucinates as of a banana. The Good-case experiential evidence is

(S) One sees a banana before one.
The Bad-case experiential evidence is

(H) One hallucinates as of a banana.

Following Silins’s earlier example involving memory, both subjects have degree of confidence .9 that there is a banana in front of them. They both believe

(F) There is a banana in front of one.

Silins argues that Evidential Externalism entails that Bad-case subjects will sometimes have more graded doxastic justification than Good-case subjects. We saw above that he assigns evidential probabilities to the good and bad subjects, and evaluates their degrees of confidence in terms of these probabilities, and Assumptions 1 and 2.

Our current form of externalism, naive realism, will use something like (H) as the evidential input for the bad-case subject. If we use (H), we can avoid Silins’ result.

(S) entails (F), and so (F)’s good-case evidential probability is 1.0. The subject’s degree of confidence is off by .1, but that is not so bad. Recall that within Silins’ framework, a delta of this size is compatible with knowledge, and with outright doxastic justification.

Turning to the Bad case, what is the probability of (F) on (H)? The view that I would like to defend is that (H) does not raise the probability of (F).

Our question about (H) and (F) is proxy for the more general issue of the relationship between the contents of full-blown hallucinations (the hallucinations of current interest), and the perceptible features of a hallucinator’s immediate environment. On this more general issue, part of our folk conception of full-blown hallucinations is that their contents are not correlated with the layout of the hallucinator’s immediate environment. According to this conception, when one hallucinates in a full-blown manner, one is out of touch with one’s immediate environment. ‘Veridical’ hallucinations are of course possible, but hallucinations of this type have no special eligibility. When philosophers write of full-blown or ‘perfect’ hallucinations, there is no default assumption that the hallucinations in question are veridical, or even at all likely to be veridical. Veridicality is consistent with the basic nature of full-blown hallucination, but it is not at all promoted by the basic nature of this phenomenon, a key part of which is a lack of contact with the world.

We’re asking about the probabilistic connection between (i) propositions that state that a subject S has a hallucination with a certain content at a certain time, and (ii) propositions that describe the perceptually apprehensible character of S’s immediate environment at that time. Drawing on the above remarks about hallucinations, I think the best
view of the relationship between propositions of these types is that they are *independent* in the probabilistic sense. If this is right, then \( P(F|H) = P(F) \). (H) does not raise the probability of (F).

Although I think the independence view collects the main insight to be had in this area, strict independence between (H) and (F) is somewhat hard to square with content externalism. Suppose that the contents of at least some ‘banana’ hallucinations are *existence-dependent* contents. On this picture, mental relations to these contents occur only in possible worlds in which at least one banana exists. For illustrative purposes, let’s take (H) to ascribe this sort of existence-dependent content to the subject’s experience. Then (H) does tell us that the hallucinating subject occupies a possible world with at least one banana in the inventory. This is an incremental advance towards (F), if we’re starting with a very generic background. If (H) ascribes an externalist content to its subject, it may be that the best view of the matter is that \( P(F|H) > P(F) \). But it is possible to overreact to this line of reasoning. The care that leads us to consider content externalism should also guard against taking \( P(F|H) \) to mark a real jump up from \( P(F) \). A subject could entertain an externalist banana content even if all bananas had vanished from existence quite some time ago, or had never existed on the subject’s continent, much less in his living room.

Also, if we invoke content externalism in our theory of evidence, we reject the idea that all internal twins share the same evidence. Therefore the above considerations do not help our main opponent. In any case content externalism does not pose a fundamental challenge to the idea that \( P(F|H) = P(F) \). But to preserve maximal generality in my discussion of hallucinatory evidence, I want to accommodate content externalism. With this theory in mind, I will say that \( P(F|H) \approx P(F) \), or that \( P(F|H) \approx P(F) \).

What then is the probability of (F)? The relevant time-slice to consider for this question is the moment before the Good and Bad subjects have their respective banana experiences. Suppose that both the Good and Bad subjects have evidence that says that

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7 I should note that the above point about internal twins draws on a different notion of internal twins than the one at work in Silins’ paper, and indeed in other parts of the present paper. Silins (pp. 376-377) defines internal twins partly in terms of the condition that they can entertain all of the same propositions, so there will be no differences in mental content between internal twins. In the current paper I have followed Silins’ definition. However, I think that an alternative notion of internal twins is sometimes at work in discussions of epistemic internalism. The alternative notion is closer to the idea of a ‘narrow physical duplicate’; it allows internal twins to differ in mental content. My impression is that at least some epistemic internalists want to defend ‘equal-justification’-type claims even when the bad-case subjects of interest cannot entertain all the propositions available in relevant good cases.
bananas are common but hardly ubiquitous items in their environments. Suppose that prior to the relevant perceptual experiences, the common evidential probability that there is a banana in a certain egocentrically specified location is .05. This of course is not the only possible common evidential situation. But I think it is a typical, representative evidential situation. Also, this assignment of prior evidence helps us to isolate the impact of the view we are evaluating: the naive-realist view of experiential evidence in Good and Bad cases.

Suppose that the Good and Bad subjects take a look at the relevant location (so to speak) and enjoy their respective experiences. At this stage, (S) and (H) are added to their respective bodies of total evidence. The Good evidential probability of (F) goes up to 1.0. But the Bad evidential probability of (F) does not see a material increase: it was .05, now it approximates .05.

The substance of my current point is independent of where I have set the bad-case numbers. In fact it can be communicated in terms of an entirely intuitive notion of evidential probability. The claim is that if we classify the bad subject’s experience as a hallucination, then adding it to the subject’s evidence does not materially raise the evidential probability of his belief. If this probability is low to begin with, then the relevant pair of experiences will leave a Bad experiential subject at a significant evidential disadvantage compared to a counterpart Good experiential subject.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experience (NR)</th>
<th>Degree of Confidence</th>
<th>Probability on Total Evidence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gary</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barry</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>≈.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since Silins’s argument assigns numerical evidential probabilities, let’s consider the effects of (F) having evidential probability ≈.05 in the Bad case. As I indicated, I think that this is a typical evidential probability for perceptual beliefs in Bad cases. Typical Good-case perceptual beliefs have evidential probability 1.0. In the rest of this paper, the typicality that I see in the respective evidential probabilities that I’ve assigned to Good and Bad experiential cases will inform my conception of typical perceptual beliefs.

Following the earlier Memory example, both subjects have degree of confidence .9 in (F). In our current scenario, according to assumptions 1 and 2, the bad-case subject does not have more doxastic justification than the good-case subject. In fact things have shifted substantially in the opposite direction. Measured against his evidential probability, the good-case subject’s degree of confidence is off by .1. But the bad-case subject’s confidence
overshoots his evidential probability by a good chunk of the available spectrum; the bad-case subject’s confidence is off by ≈.85. Assumptions 1 and 2 tell us that the bad-case subject is much farther off from where he ought to be, and that his belief is much less doxastically justified for this reason.

Silins assigns Good and Bad evidential probabilities to a proposition, and then considers cases in which the subjects’ shared degree of confidence in the proposition is closer to the Bad evidential probability. By the lights of Assumptions 1 and 2, this comparative edge gives the Bad-case belief a greater degree of doxastic justification. I have countered Silins’ argument by claiming that we should associate the naïve-realist position with a different set of evidential probabilities. Naive realists should not accept the bad-case evidential probability at work in Silins’ argument. My view is that a typical Good-case perceptual belief has evidential probability 1.0, and a typical Bad-case perceptual belief has evidential probability ≈.05. On this accounting, if our two subjects share a high degree of confidence, Assumptions 1 and 2 do not threaten to elevate the bad subject over the good subject with respect to degree-theoretic doxastic justification.

In principle, degrees of confidence can fall at any point on the [0,1] spectrum. We can reproduce Silins’ result by considering cases in which the two subjects have very low degrees of confidence. But this does not revive Silins’ argument taken as an argument against naïve realism. First, it is a bit odd to invoke low-confidence cases in our current setting. On a natural understanding of Bad cases, their subjects are deceived by the character of their experiences. Such deception would seem to involve high confidence in propositions like (F). Of course, we can explain low confidence in (F) in a case of perfect hallucination by introducing further significant factors, but doing so seems to take us away from the main features of Good and Bad cases that inspire our current debate.

Second, cases involving very low degrees of confidence clash with the assumption that knowledge requires a reasonably high degree of confidence (on this assumption, compare Williamson 2000, p. 97). By definition, internal twins share degrees of confidence; also by definition, Good-case subjects have knowledge. Assume that knowledge-level degrees of confidence must fall on or above a reasonably high threshold. Internal twins with shared degrees of confidence that are below this threshold are not relevant to our discussion, because their level of confidence establishes that neither twin is in a Good case.

The internal twins relevant to our discussion respectively occupy Good and Bad cases, and therefore have knowledge-level degrees of confidence. In Silins’ Memory
example, Gary’s knowledgeable memorial belief, one that involves some normal caution about the reliability of his memory, is described as involving degree of confidence .9. For present purposes, our attributions of knowledge-level confidence should not fall much below this region, at least in connection with similar examples. This policy on knowledge-level confidence will keep us in the vicinity of our original perceptual example, which avoids Silins’ objection.

Section 4
I have credited the Bad-case subject with a generic stock of prior evidence which confers probability .05 on the proposition that there is a banana in a certain location. And I have said that the Bad-case subject’s experience is not a material probability-raiser, since it should be classified as a hallucination. The result is that typical Bad-case perceptual beliefs draw on very low evidential probabilities. Someone might reply that I am overlooking the potential impact of some evidence which is typically available to subjects. We should also consider what the rest of the Bad-case subject’s evidence might say about his own perceptual faculties. Suppose that the following proposition is part of the subject’s evidence:

(M) My perceptual faculties are reliable.

The thought is that if we conjoin (M) with the subject’s experiential evidence, then the evidential probability of (F)—that there is a banana in front of one—will go up, perhaps quite a bit.

This thought runs along an interesting line, but its application is blocked by the naïve-realist conception of hallucinatory evidence. The probability of (F) on (H) I’m hallucinating as of a banana and (M) my perceptual faculties are reliable is no higher than the probability of (F) on (H) alone. If vision is the only relevant input, the specific information that your current visual experience is a misfire trumps the broader point that your perceptual faculties are generally reliable.

At least some versions of externalism about evidence will be cautious about the inclusion of (M) in a subject’s evidence. Williamson’s proposal is that a proposition is part of a subject’s evidence if and only if the subject knows the proposition. If we accept E=K, ascriptions of evidence to bad-case subjects require caution. For instance, (M) is not true, much less known, in the brain-in-a-vat cases of classic internalist sponsorship. However, on my view of hallucinatory evidence, (M) does not make a probabilistic difference in hallucinatory cases, even when it is known and/or part of a subject’s evidence. By my lights,
a case of mere hallucination still assigns very low evidential probabilities to typical perceptual beliefs.  

Silins claims that his ‘bad case is not better’ objection can be advanced without Assumptions 1 and 2 (pp. 387, 391). Since I have replied to his objection while accepting these assumptions, it’s not dialectically crucial to see how things look if we drop them. However, since the assumptions are quite strong, there is some interest in considering how things work in a more moderate setting.

Assumptions 1 and 2 set a very demanding standard for the top grade of degree-theoretic doxastic justification. On these assumptions, you lose doxastic-justification points if your degree of confidence departs at all from your belief’s actual evidential probability. A more moderate idea considered by Silins is that ‘one ought to be more confident in some propositions in the good case than in the bad case’ (p. 391). I will briefly examine a related broader principle: that one’s degrees of confidence should conform closely to one’s evidential probabilities. (I won’t attempt to spell out ‘closeness’. I lean against Assumptions 1 and 2, but I won’t take a stand on exactly what we should replace them with).

In connection with this broader principle, graded doxastic justification is still defined in terms of conformity to evidential probability. However, incremental doxastic divergence from one’s evidential probability presumably no longer triggers a loss of degrees of justification.

This more moderate package does not make trouble for naive realists if we combine it with their assignments of evidential probabilities in Good and Bad cases. Internal twins in counterpart Good and Bad cases share degrees of confidence which are high enough for knowledge. Our working policy on knowledge-level degrees of confidence keeps these degrees of confidence much closer to the good-case evidential probability than to the bad-case evidential probability. The more moderate package does not threaten to elevate the bad-case subject over the good-case subject with respect to degree-theoretic justification.

Suppose we agree with Silins that it would be very awkward if a determinate bad-case subject had more graded doxastic justification than a determinate good-case subject. We have not found any reason to attribute this outcome to the naive-realist position on experiential evidence.

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8 Someone might complain that there are substantial epistemic differences between a BIV subject and a subject who knows (M), but who happens to have a hallucinatory false belief, and that my views on evidence cannot account for these differences. A very brief reply is that it’s not obvious that we should try to represent every epistemic difference between two subjects as a difference in the evidential probabilities of their beliefs.
Section 5

Recall that there are four versions of the Equal Justification thesis about internal twins.

**Graded Propositional Justification (GPJ)**
For all propositions p, internal twins’ situations confer the same degrees of justification on these propositions.

**Graded Doxastic Justification (GDJ)**
Internal twins’ beliefs are justified to the same degree.

**Outright Propositional Justification (OPJ)**
Internal twins’ situations confer outright justification on the same propositions.

**Outright Doxastic Justification (ODJ)**
Internal twins do not differ in their outright justified beliefs.

Starting with GPJ, my commitment in the vicinity is that Good and Bad experiential cases confer markedly different evidential probabilities on typical perceptual beliefs. If we identify degree-theoretic propositional justification with evidential probability, then I reject GPJ. However, this identification is not a good fit with my discussion of outright epistemic justification in the next section. I will argue that our ascriptions of outright doxastic justification should not focus exclusively on evidential probability. If we accept this argument, then it would be at least somewhat awkward to analyze graded propositional justification exclusively in terms of evidential probability. However, even with this complication on the horizon, it is clear that my position on Good and Bad evidential probabilities leans strongly against the GPJ outlook on internal twins. Evidential probability and propositional justification are similar notions; the former notion is one of the things that the latter notion tries to capture. Good-case subjects come out far ahead on the measure of the evidential probability of their perceptual beliefs.

My position on evidential probability also militates against the idea (GDJ) that internal twins’ beliefs are justified to the same degree. This point must also be filtered through my upcoming discussion of justification, as well as my agnosticism about replacements for Assumptions 1 and 2. But again it’s clear that I’m averse to GDJ’s basic idea. Conformity to evidential probability is one of the properties of belief that the notion of doxastic justification tries to capture. A typical bad-case perceptual belief will overshoot its evidential probability by a very large margin. Measured in terms of conformity to evidential probability, typical good-case perceptual beliefs fare far better than typical bad-case perceptual beliefs.
I lean strongly against GPJ and GDJ. Further sharpening of my position would require a much closer look at the nature of degree-theoretic epistemic justification; this is a loose end of the current paper. I turn now to the remaining outright claims about epistemic justification and internal twins, OPJ and ODJ.

I accept these claims. Typical bad-case beliefs have epistemic virtues that I think are well understood in terms of the notion of outright justification. These virtues are compatible with the epistemic defects that I attribute to bad-case beliefs, defects which centre around low evidential probability. Equally, the idea that bad-case subjects have outright justified beliefs does not subvert the naive-realist understanding of perceptual knowledge that I wish to promote.

Section 6
I will start with outright doxastic justification. Recall that outright justification is an on-off notion. We use it to judge whether beliefs are justified, or not justified. Outright justification is a much more coarse-grained notion than the degree-theoretic concepts from earlier sections. Therefore we should expect the category of outright justified beliefs to subsume beliefs with genuine epistemic differences.

It’s not in dispute that our good-case subject who sees a banana has knowledge, so we can assume that he has outright doxastic justification. Many philosophers find it intuitive that the bad-case subject has outright doxastic justification as well. I think this intuition is on the right track. As a result, I want to accept the outright Equal Justification theses available to us, while opposing their graded counterparts. Our question in this section is whether we can do this without doing violence to familiar conceptions of justification.

A main worry is that it may be hard to square my claim that the bad-case subject has outright doxastic justification with my harsh degree-theoretic verdicts about the bad case. The bad-case subject has a high-confidence belief based on evidence which confers only very low evidential probability on the relevant proposition (that there is a banana before one). My overall proposal is that a justified belief can exhibit this sort of mismatch—that is, an outright justified belief can overshoot its evidential probability by a very large margin; and this may seem odd.

We can create some space for my proposal by taking a closer look at our notion of justification. We tend to associate two ideas with this notion that are worth highlighting. These two ideas may not be the only ideas that we closely associate with epistemic
justification, but they are influential, and they are relevant to our current discussion. For simplicity I will speak of ‘our two-part conception of justification’.

First, we think that justified beliefs are good candidates for knowledge, especially if the beliefs are also true. This gloss on justified belief has roots in the project of analyzing knowledge partly in terms of justified true belief, and in the related, fairly common idea that subjects’ beliefs in Gettier cases have properties that make them good candidates for knowledge (despite other knowledge-blocking defects).

In the next few paragraphs (and in section 8), I will try to make a few points in terms of the notion of being a good candidate for knowledge. These points are admittedly no sharper than their key ingredient notion, but they may nonetheless be compelling.

Our second thought about justified beliefs is that they represent the appropriate conduct of inquiry. Justified beliefs are intellectually appropriate beliefs to have. This is of course a broad, thematic characterization of epistemic justification, which can be articulated in different ways.\(^9\)

If we hold that brain-in-a-vat subjects have justified beliefs, we run a kind of test on the above two-part conception of justification. From the test, two points emerge about this conception. We see that the two ideas we associate with epistemic justification can come apart, and we see that the second ‘conduct of inquiry’ idea wins out in this battle. For BIV beliefs are not good candidates for knowledge, even when they are true.

Our bad-case BIV believes that there is a banana before him. Consider a scenario in which this belief is true. The day-shift evil scientist leaves a banana in the room, and the night-shift evil scientist unwittingly and coincidentally programs a course of experience that includes an experience as of a banana. In reaction to this experience, the subject believes, correctly, that there is a banana in front of him.

Although the BIV’s experience leads to a true belief, this experience is not caused by the local banana. This is a Gettier-type defect. But a further problem with the BIV belief is that the experiential methods which produce it are not generally reliable. The causal disconnect between object and experience in this case is not an aberration. Rather, the aberration is that the BIV subject has a true perceptual belief. By contrast, typical Gettier subjects are depicted as being in very good, knowledge-ready epistemic shape, but for the

\(^9\) Many of the philosophical characterizations of epistemic justification collected at Alston 2005, p. 12-15 develop the broad ‘intellectual appropriateness’ theme. In a number of recent papers (e.g. his 2002, 2004), Richard Foley explicitly links both of the notions that I introduce in the main text to our contemporary conception of justification, although he does this in a critical spirit (see note 11 of the present paper).
localized, single-case snags which prevent them from having knowledge. These snags are things like a disguised dog, or a false report from one’s boss. The material epistemic defects of typical Gettier beliefs derive from these single-case snags. In our example, the true-belief BIV subject has relevant epistemic problems which go beyond the standard Gettier maladies, and for this reason his belief is not a good candidate for knowledge.\textsuperscript{10}

Nonetheless many of us think that this subject’s perceptual belief is justified. This thought, I suggest, draws heavily on the second element in our conception of justification: the notion of appropriate inquiry. We think that the BIV subject has a justified belief because we think that he is conducting inquiry appropriately.

If we assume that our conception of justification has these two elements, we see from the above that the ‘conduct of inquiry’ element has greater influence on our ascriptions of doxastic justification. There are cases of central epistemological interest in which we regard a belief as justified even though it is not a good candidate for knowledge. This point blocks a main objection to the view that outright justified beliefs can have very low evidential probability. An opponent of this view might say ‘Look, by allowing justified beliefs to have very low evidential probability, you are making a mockery of the idea that justified beliefs are good candidates for knowledge.’ The response is that we are in a setting that has already given up on this idea. Call the idea that \textit{a brain-in-a-vat’s perceptual beliefs are justified} ‘the pro-BIV intuition’. The popularity of the pro-BIV intuition reveals that our conception of justification is more keyed to the appropriate conduct of inquiry, and that in some philosophically interesting cases we set the ‘good candidate’ idea to the side.

Taking these points on board, in the rest of the paper, I will not take ascriptions of outright doxastic justification to assert that the belief in question (if true) is a good candidate for knowledge. At least for present purposes, ascriptions of outright doxastic justification assert that the beliefs in question are intellectually appropriate, and that’s it. Although we habitually associate justification with the ‘good candidate for knowledge’ condition, our intuitions about BIV cases indicate that this link is relatively superficial.\textsuperscript{11}

\textsuperscript{10} Foley agrees that BIV true beliefs are not good candidates for knowledge; see his 2002, pp. 723-724; 2004, pp. 67, 69. In Foley’s 2004 discussion, the attendant demon occasionally allows a BIV subject to have isolated true beliefs, but I don’t think this variation makes a difference.

\textsuperscript{11} Foley’s view is that something like the appropriate-conduct notion is the core of our concept of epistemic justification, and that the ‘good candidate for knowledge’ idea has been artificially grafted on to this concept. He writes: ‘It is not a necessary condition of epistemic justification that it turns true beliefs into knowledge, absent Gettier problems. One of the lessons to be learned from the demon cases and the like is that one’s beliefs can be epistemically justified even when they are so thoroughly mistaken that the occasional true ones are not good candidates for knowledge’ (2004, p. 69).
The preceding objection argued that my view on outright justified belief and evidential probability does not fit with the first component of our conception of justification. Another objection is that my view does not fit with the apparently more fundamental second component of this conception. We cannot regard a belief as intellectually appropriate—even in a broad, ‘on-off’ sense—if it overshoots its evidential probability by a very large margin. Rational thinkers respect their evidence. A belief-level analogue of this idea is that rational (or justified) beliefs conform to available evidence. But, on my picture of his situation, the Bad-case subject does not respect his evidence, and so cannot be regarded as having a justified belief.

The current opponent proposes a tight connection between intellectual appropriateness and conformity to evidential probability. This connection would subvert my attempt to combine acceptance of the outright doxastic version of the Equal Justification thesis about internal twins with my view on experiential evidential probability in the Bad case. I will try to place some distance between intellectual appropriateness and conformity to evidential probability, by suggesting that the former notion might be sensitive to a broader range of factors. If all goes well, our discussion will evolve in a way that marginalizes ‘respect the evidence’ principles as dialectical actors.

Our bad-case subject hallucinates as of a banana, and believes that there is a banana before him. Although his belief overshoots its evidential probability, it is an appropriate extension of inquiry in a genuine sense. This alternative sense requires some elaboration. It will be easiest to communicate if we take a subject’s experiential evidence to be his experience itself, rather than the propositional rendering of this experience that I have employed at other points in this paper.

Discussions of evidential probability tend to focus our attention on just that: on the numerically represented probabilities that evidence confers on various propositions. This focus can lead us to tacitly exaggerate how much epistemic information these probabilities actually convey. We should not assume that the only epistemically relevant features of a piece of evidence are (i) the probability that it confers on the propositions of interest, and (ii) the features of the evidence which determine this probability. Other features of a piece of evidence can make an epistemic difference.

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12 All references to intellectual appropriateness in the remainder of this paper refer to an outright or on-off version of this notion, which corresponds to outright epistemic justification.
13 The above idea about rationality is a foil in Williamson 2000’s discussion of evidence (see, e.g., p. 165).
My view is that hallucinations do not materially raise the evidential probability of typical perceptual beliefs. Note that hallucinations share this negative feature with many other mental states, including the belief that Obama is president. But the hallucinations of current interest, perfect hallucinations, have important distinctive features. Although they are not material probability raisers for typical perceptual beliefs, they are subjectively indistinguishable from states that are probability raisers of this kind.

Perfect hallucinations are a very rare, exceptional kind of evidence. They are very bad pieces of evidence which appear to be very good pieces of evidence. The deceptive appearance of this evidence is objective in the following sense. The true character of perfect hallucinations is not discernable via first-person means by members of our species (or by any other relevant party).

In a dispute with an internalist about evidence, the claim that a BIV’s beliefs are intellectually appropriate is common ground. Our issue is whether we can understand this claim without attributing high evidential probability to the BIV’s beliefs. I think that the distinctive features of perfect hallucinatory experiences can explain the intellectual appropriateness of forming beliefs on the basis of these experiences, even though these experiences do not materially raise the probability of these beliefs.

Consider a bad-case subject whose perceptual belief and background intellectual habits are as isomorphic as possible to a good-case subject who has perceptual knowledge, and who more generally is a good epistemic citizen. It’s hard to argue that the bad-case subject’s perceptual belief is not intellectually appropriate. This is partly a point about the common properties of the two subjects. I think that the above description establishes genuine overlap between the two subjects. But it is more a point about how the perfect character of the bad-case hallucination combines with available conceptual material to limit our evaluative options. Our current notion of intellectual appropriateness is an ‘on/off’ notion that matches the outright notion of justification. This is a broad notion of intellectual appropriateness, which, like the outright notion of justification itself, can presumably subsume beliefs with genuine epistemic differences. A broad notion of intellectual appropriateness doesn’t seem to be demanding enough to exclude a bad-case subject whose doxastic failings are due to species-level limitations of perceptual discrimination. A BIV’s perceptual beliefs can be appropriate, given the objective difficulty of his circumstances.

Here I explain the intellectual appropriateness of a BIV’s perceptual beliefs in terms of the deeply deceptive character of his evidence, a theme of Williamson’s recent discussions.
(see 2000, pp. 177, 180), rather than in terms of high evidential probability possessed by the BIV’s beliefs. Intellectual appropriateness and conformity to evidential probability can come apart in cases where a subject’s evidence is apparently good, but undetectably bad. Borrowing a notion from an argument against behaviourism, in Bad cases one’s evidence is a ‘perfect actor’. This evidence is not good evidence, but going in for the disguise is intellectually appropriate.

I have defended the idea that a bad-case subject’s perceptual beliefs are intellectually appropriate, despite the fact that these beliefs do not conform to their probability on the subject’s evidence. Evidential probability is not the only variable in our assessments of intellectual appropriateness. Evidential probability is not even the only evidence-related input to judgments of intellectual appropriateness. At least in some exceptional cases, other features of a subject’s evidence can take up the slack.

Let’s return now to the idea that rational thinkers respect their evidence. We need to consider a version of this idea that applies to token beliefs. It’s common to take ‘rational belief’ and ‘justified belief’ as synonymous in epistemological discussions of belief. I will continue to speak in terms of justification.

(J) Justified beliefs respect the evidence.

The modal and quantificational force of this statement is not clear. Is the idea that necessarily, all justified beliefs respect the evidence? A more moderate suggestion is that all justified beliefs in a very wide but non-exhaustive range of cases respect the evidence.

Another interpretive task queries what it means to ‘respect the evidence’. One salient way to respect the evidence is to conform one’s belief to the probability that one’s evidence confers on it. Since apparently rational bad-case subjects don’t do this, this form of respect is clearly what the objection to my view has in mind. But recall my claim that the epistemically relevant properties of a piece of evidence are not exhausted by the properties that determine its evidential probability. This thought points toward other forms of reverence. The bad-case subjects of current interest conform their beliefs to what their experiences purport to be. This is a non-trivial, non-automatic form of respect. For present purposes, we don’t need to substantially demote a probability-driven conception of respecting the evidence. All we need to allow is that less discerning forms of respect are acceptable in certain exceptional circumstances.
(J) admits of a range of interpretations of varying dialectical force. Since it’s doubtful that common sense settles the interpretive questions that (J) poses, I don’t think (J) is a real obstacle to my view that outright intellectually appropriate beliefs can significantly overshoot their evidential probability. This view provides strong support to my package of claims about the epistemic properties of bad-case subjects.

Section 7

I affirm that internal-twin Good and Bad perceptual beliefs are justified in the outright sense. I accept the Outright Doxastic Justification version of the Equal Justification thesis:

**Outright Doxastic Justification (ODJ)**

Internal twins do not differ in their outright justified beliefs.

What about the remaining ‘equal justification’ claim which concerns outright propositional justification? This is

**Outright Propositional Justification (OPJ)**

Internal twins’ situations confer outright justification on the same propositions.

There are some questions about how to connect propositional justification with doxastic justification, and with evidential probability. I will answer these questions on the basis of previous material. Suppose we stipulate that necessarily, beliefs with outright doxastic justification exploit available outright propositional justification. Then, unless we assume that differences in available outright propositional justification are necessarily not exploited, acceptance of ODJ leads to acceptance of OPJ.

But there is not a necessary connection between having outright propositional justification for a belief and having evidence which confers high probability on that belief. The above stipulation ties propositional justification to doxastic justification, and in turn to our intuitions about the appropriate conduct of inquiry. Combined with my view of experiential evidence, this conception of justification allows for situations in which propositional justification is available for a subject’s belief even though actual evidential support is not. Alston’s definition of propositional justification is worth recalling:

‘A proposition, \( P \), may be said to be justified for \( S \) provided \( S \) is so situated that if he were to make use of that situation to form a belief that \( P \), that belief would be justified. (\( S \) can be justified vis-a-vis \( P \) in this sense even if \( [S] \) does not have a justified belief that \( P \). It is just that in attributing justification in this sense to \( S \) one is leaving it open whether \( S \) has a belief that \( P \).’ (Alston 2005, p. 18)
This definition of propositional justification refers to a subject’s situation, not to his evidence. The definition can accommodate the idea that propositional justification is not always rooted in evidence. I have argued that special features of bad-case situations provide justification for typical perceptual beliefs, even though these beliefs do not draw on actual evidential support.

I accept OPJ. But I will add that it is a good example of how use of the outright notion of justification involves a lot of information loss. OPJ does not highlight all that is available in a Good case, and all that is missing in a Bad case. As I see it, the idiom of justification works to exaggerate the similarities between these situations. OPJ does capture the fact that Good and Bad situations set up a common path of belief for their subjects that is sanctioned by a broad notion of the appropriate conduct of inquiry. This is a genuine epistemic similarity. But there is some risk of overstating its significance.

Section 8
In this closing section I return to our main naïve-realist claim about perceptual knowledge.

Instances of perceptual knowledge should be understood and explained partly in terms of subjects basing their beliefs on entailing experiential grounds.

One of Silins’ arguments against Evidential Externalism is that acceptance of the ‘outright’ parts of the Equal Justification package imperils externalist explanations of the knowledge that we achieve in Good cases (p. 398; compare p. 386). This argument is part of a discussion of the prospects for an externalist response to scepticism. As a part of this response to scepticism, the externalist must settle whether BIV subjects have outright propositional justification to believe that they’re not brains in vats. The obvious extension of my earlier ideas is that they do have this outright justification. This belief is intellectually appropriate in their circumstances.

Silins’ objection to this position is as follows (I believe that his reference to ‘Mooreanism’ is dispensable).

The other option for the externalist is to grant that one is justified in believing in the bad case that one is not a BIV. Since their Moorean [or just ‘good-case’] story is not available in the bad case, they will have to accept some story which is available to the internalist, and which applies in the good case as well. Here the internalist is as well positioned as the externalist to hold that one is justified in believing that the sceptical hypothesis is false. The externalist will simply add that one enjoys an extra justification in the good case. However, it is no advantage for the externalist to grant us an extra anti-sceptical justification in the good case. The extra justification available in the good case is not required for one to be outright justified in disbelieving the hypothesis. The extra justification also is not required to explain how
one knows that the sceptical hypothesis is false: one’s belief in the good case is not inferred from a false premise, and it seems that one is not otherwise in danger of having justified true belief without knowledge...[if the externalist takes the current option] one need not endorse Evidential Externalism to explain how one is justified in disbelieving sceptical hypotheses, or even to explain how one knows they are false. (p. 398)

Starting with the first part of this quotation, I do accept a story about outright propositional justification which applies in both the good and bad case. (The story is more easily told in terms of doxastic justification, but it’s the same story). Standard perceptual beliefs are intellectually appropriate in both cases, as is the belief that one is not a brain-in-a-vat. But this point about outright justification does not undermine externalist attempts to explain good-case knowledge. For possession of outright justification does not establish that one’s belief is a good candidate for knowledge, even when one’s belief is true. This was the lesson of our section 6 discussion of the true-belief BIV subject. Accordingly, the ‘extra’ justification that externalism offers is not extra at all.

The latter parts of Silins’ quotation assume that the only work left for an externalist contribution would be to clean up the types of knowledge-blocking problems that affect Gettier subjects who have justified true beliefs. However, if we understand justification as intellectual appropriateness, our ascription of outright justification to a subject does not establish parity with typical Gettier subjects. I assume that these subjects are in a good position to have knowledge. The ascription of outright justification doesn’t get us that far. Even with outright justification in place, we still need to draw level with typical Gettier subjects, or surpass them.

Naive realist ideas can play a role here. Basing your belief on an entailing experiential ground makes the belief a good candidate for knowledge. At least, an entailing experiential ground is a very solid contribution to that effort, a contribution that brings the relevant evidential probability up to 1.0. Entailing experiential grounds make an epistemic difference, even after outright justification has been allocated to both good and bad parties.

I see entailing experiential grounds as having a direct impact on our understanding of perceptual beliefs like ‘That’s a banana.’ Following other writers on naive realism, I think that entailing experiential evidence can also play a role in a critical response to scepticism; but I will not explore this here. The key dialectical point against Silins is that the concession of shared outright justification does not compromise naïve realists’ distinctive understanding
of the Good case, because this concession is not a large jump ahead on the explanation of knowledge.

Silins is correct that we don’t need Evidential Externalism to explain how we are justified in disbelieving sceptical hypotheses. But if we accept that BIVs share this justification, and have other justified perceptual beliefs, the effect of this picture is to marginalize justification in the project of understanding knowledge. This is not a partisan naïve-realist reading of the situation; this line of thought has independent support in the literature.¹⁴ This line of thought allows us to combine a naïve-realist understanding of perceptual knowledge with a positive but limited appraisal of the epistemic properties of bad-case subjects.¹⁵

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¹⁴ See again Foley.
¹⁵ Thanks to audiences at the Aristotelian Society and at a workshop on the epistemology of perception at the University of Geneva for helpful comments and discussion.
References


