

Heirs of Nothing: The Implications of Transparency

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Recently representationalists have cited a phenomenon known as the transparency of experience in arguments against the qualia theory. Representationalists take transparency to support their theory and to work against the qualia theory. In this paper I argue that representationalist assessment of the philosophical importance of transparency is incorrect. The true beneficiary of transparency is another theory, naïve realism. Transparency militates against qualia *and* the representationalist theory of experience. I describe the transparency phenomenon, and I use my description to argue for naïve realism and against representationalism and the qualia theory. I also examine the relationship between phenomenological study and phenomenal character, and discuss the results in connection with the argument from hallucination.

What is the transparency of experience, and what does this phenomenon tell us about the metaphysical structure of experience? A provisional statement of the phenomenon is this: when we try to become aware of our experiences, the only things available for inspection are the objects of experience. Aspects of our experiences themselves are not to be found. G.E. Moore introduced the notion of the transparency of experience in the course of his famous attack on idealism. More recently, Gilbert Harman has used transparency to argue against the contemporary qualia theory, and to support his contemporary representationalist theory of the structure of experience. (For similar use of transparency, see Tye 1995, 2000). Harman's 1990 paper initiated a large debate about the transparency of experience and its implications for representationalism ("R") and qualia ("Q").¹ I will call this debate the R/Q discussion of transparency.

Here I will argue that the implications of transparency are not quite as Harman describes them. Both parties in the R/Q discussion of transparency are guilty. Transparency works against qualia *and* representationalism. A closer look at the transparency phenomenon indicates that representationalism and the qualia theory share common phenomenological flaws. The transparency phenomenon motivates another theory: naïve realism. This theory is the true heir of Moore's phenomenological insight.

¹ See Harman 1990, Block 1990, 2003, Tye 1995, 2000, Kind 2003, Loar 2003, Siewert 2003, Stoljar 2004, Lormand 2006.

These claims have some foothold in recent discussions of naïve realism and transparency (Alston 1999, 2005; Martin 2002).² But, partly due to terminological differences, more work is needed to bring out the positive connection between the theory and the phenomenon. Here I describe the transparency phenomenon, and then I use this description to argue for naïve realism and against representationalism and the qualia theory. As a part of my discussion of transparency, I argue for a conception of phenomenological study that helps naïve realism respond to the argument from hallucination.

Throughout I focus on visual experience. For much of the paper, I circumscribe my discussion even more narrowly, focusing on the transparency of veridical visual experience.³ I discuss hallucinations in later sections of the paper.

Section 1.1

Moore wrote

...the moment we try to fix our attention upon consciousness and to see what, distinctly, it is, it seems to vanish: it seems as if we had before us a mere emptiness. When we try to introspect the sensation of blue, all we can see is the blue: the other element is as if it were diaphanous. Yet it can be distinguished if we look attentively enough, and if we know that there is something to look for (Moore 1903, p. 41 in 1993 reprint).

In our discussion of the experiential phenomenon that Moore calls to our attention, we must distinguish between the *phenomenon itself*, and various *philosophical claims* about experience that draw on the phenomenon as evidence. I will call the phenomenon the “transparency phenomenon,” or often just “transparency.”

² I discuss Alston and Martin in later parts of the paper.

³ Roughly, a subject's experiential awareness of an object in his environment is veridical when the subject's awareness is without significant levels of error (ruling out illusion) or coincidence (ruling out veridical illusion). I assume that if a subject is experientially aware of an object in his immediate environment, then his experiential state in this case is not a hallucination.

A claim that appeals for support to the transparency phenomenon is often called “a transparency thesis.” The distinction between the phenomenon and surrounding theoretical claims is an important one (Daniel Stoljar emphasizes this distinction in his 2004).

Distinguishing between the phenomenon and surrounding theory allows us to acknowledge the phenomenon while remaining neutral about claims that aim to rely on the phenomenon for support.

Turning to the transparency phenomenon, I will divide this phenomenon into two data points.⁴ Starting with the first data point, Moore says that when we try to introspect the sensation of blue, *all we see is the blue*. Moore’s example is one in which we are aware of a property, the color blue. But his point is not restricted to awareness of properties. It applies equally well to cases in which we are aware of material particulars. Adapting an example from Harman (1990, p. 667), suppose that you see a tree, and that you try to become aware of your experience of the tree. It may seem to you that the only thing to focus on is the tree. Apparently, at least, all that you have to work with is the tree.

Keeping the focus on material objects, they have a substantial perceptual presence to us. Adding a bit to this point, material things have a *dominant* perceptual presence to us. In many paradigmatic cases of visual experience, material objects seem to exhaust the territory of which we have a view. They have a “monopoly” on our subjective attention. They are, at least apparently, the only things of which we are aware. These observations connect with one aspect of the transparency phenomenon, which I will call “manifest presence.”

⁴ The two data points, taken in reverse order, roughly correspond to the elements in the “two-pronged [transparency-based] challenge” to the sense-datum theory that Michael Martin develops in his 2002 (see pp. 383-384, 386).

The manifest presence of an object includes the presence of its perceptible properties. My precise statements of naïve realism will refer to perceptible properties, and perceptible properties will also play a role in my discussion of hallucinations. In other parts of the paper, I will often simply write of material objects, because, in my discussion of representationalism and the qualia theory, the nature of our perceptual awareness of these objects will be precisely what is at issue.

The second data point that I take from Moore's passage is that, as compared to the objects of experience, our experiences themselves lack any such immediate, obvious, dominant presence. In fact, as Moore says, we are apt to think that our experiences are not present to us at all. When we try to become aware of our experiences, it is natural to conclude that such awareness is impossible. Experience seems to be "diaphanous" in that we look right through it. It is clear from his passage that Moore thinks that these contentions are not quite right; he thinks that we can be aware of our experiences. Nonetheless, Moore is sympathetic to the idea that we cannot be aware of our experiences, in that he thinks that the idea has a phenomenological basis or source.

This source is the second data point stemming from transparency, and it's what I want to capture here. While the objects of experience are manifestly present to us, experience lacks this sort of prominent profile. Experience is "apparently absent." I will use this phrase to refer to the second data point that is part of experiential transparency. Apparent absence captures the comparative elusiveness of experience itself.

My notion of apparent absence is meant to be *neutral* on the issue of whether we are aware of our experiences. This issue is up for grabs, and we should be ready for reversals. Experiences might be present to us after all. But the notion of apparent absence is meant to describe the subjective phenomena that we have to deal with in this area.

Section 1.2

In the next section I connect my conception of transparency with naïve realism. Before doing so I'll say a bit more about the conception itself.

As I understand them, the notions of manifest presence and apparent absence do not describe or report on the *phenomenal character* of experience. I take phenomenal characters to be properties of token experiences that capture or embody what it's like to have the experiences. ("Phenomenal character" on its own refers to the generic what-it's-like of visual experience). My phenomenological descriptions in this section and other parts of the paper are not elucidations of phenomenal character. The concept of phenomenal character has descriptive weaknesses that lead me to seek some distance from the property to which the concept refers.

When I see the green vase in my hallway, its manifest presence to me is not well captured by construing this presence as a property of my experience. This construal moves things in the wrong direction. By shifting subjective weight from the vase over to my experience of it, the concept of phenomenal character distorts the objectual presence that the notion of manifest presence tries to capture. This descriptive problem arises for our awareness of objects, and of properties. Here I assume that redness and other color properties are not properties of our experiences. When I see a "Victory Red" Hummer vehicle, describing the ingredient manifest presence of redness to me in terms of the phenomenal character of my experience gives credit to the wrong actor. The concept of phenomenal character distorts the presence of objects and properties by converting this presence into a property of something else. We don't solve this problem by using the concept in lengthier or more careful descriptions of objectual presence. We solve the problem by using another concept.

Accordingly, I reject the idea that manifest presence is part of the phenomenal character of experience. If it were, then the concept of phenomenal character would have a better fit with it. Since the notions of manifest presence and apparent absence are connected, apparent absence is not part of the phenomenal character of experience either. Although the things that are manifestly present to us have some links with phenomenal character (cf. section 4.2), we need to avoid the latter idiom in order to keep contact with the nature of manifest presence and apparent absence.

My first point, then, is that these elements are not parts of the phenomenal character of experience. Corollaries are that phenomenological study draws on more than phenomenal character, and in turn that phenomenological accuracy or aptness is not simply a matter of phenomenal character. I will come back to these points in later parts of the paper.

Section 1.3

In this section I connect my conception of transparency with the work of recent naïve realists, and I describe how the transparency phenomenon supports naïve realism.

Although the transparency of experience plays an important role in the work of recent naïve realists, these philosophers often use different terms to refer to this phenomenon.

Here is a representative passage from William Alston:

I look out my study window and observe a variegated scene. There are maple, birch, and spruce trees in my front yard. Squirrels scurry across the lawn and up and down the trees. Birds fly in and out of the scene...

The most intuitively attractive way of characterizing my state of consciousness as I observe all this is to say that it consists of the *presentation* of physical objects to consciousness. Upon opening one's eyes one is *presented* with a variegated scene, consisting of objects spread out in space, displaying various characteristics. . . To deliberately flaunt a controversial term, it seems that these objects are *given* to one's awareness. It seems for all the world as if I enjoy *direct, unmediated* awareness of those objects. There is, apparently, nothing at all "between" my mind

and the objects I am perceiving. They are simply *displayed* to my awareness (1999, 182, original italics).

I suggest that Alston's passage calls our attention to the same experiential phenomenon that Moore highlights. I have identified two aspects of experiential transparency: the manifest presence of external objects, and the apparent absence of experience. Alston is certainly talking about the manifest presence of external objects. He gives a quite vivid, forceful description of this aspect of the transparency phenomenon. To that extent at least, Alston is talking about transparency.

What about the apparent absence of experience? Admittedly this is not part of Alston's discussion. But the notion of apparent absence resonates well with the main currents of Alston's passage. Alston argues that, in experience, it's as if material things are directly present to us. Nothing gets in the way. If we add the tenor-preserving observation that, as far as we can tell, nothing *experiential* gets in the way either, then we have captured the essentials of apparent absence. Alston, then, seems to be talking about transparency. Naïve realists are in position to engage the recent transparency debate,⁵ and to draw support from a phenomenon that has attracted significant historical and contemporary interest.

Getting a proper sense of the positive connection between naïve realism and transparency involves taking a closer look at naïve realism itself. Naïve realism is a view about the structure of experience in veridical cases. The "structure" of experience in question is its structure as a mental state. The **structure of experience** consists of the metaphysical constituents of experience and their functional arrangement. Naïve realists

⁵ Martin 2002 is an earlier example of explicit naïve-realist engagement with the R/Q transparency debate. My naïve transparency argument is different from Martin's. See note 16 of this paper.

think of veridical experience as a relation between subjects and material particulars and their perceptible properties. When a subject sees a red automobile, his experience is a subjective intentional relation to the automobile and its perceptible properties. (These properties include at least the automobile's color, shape, and size). Nothing else, no sense data or other items, are elements of this relational structure. Describing his version of naïve realism, the Theory of Appearing, Alston writes

TA takes perceptual consciousness to be ineluctably *relational* in character. And, where one is genuinely perceiving objects, situations, and events in the external environment, it takes this to involve relations to external objects. (Alston 1999, p. 182).

Naïve realists thus have a strongly “externalist” conception of veridical experience, one on which a perceiver's subjective state includes the object of perception as a constituent. The ideological import of this view is that veridical experience is world-involving at a fundamental subjective level. (See section 4.2 for a statement of naïve realism in terms of consciousness).

Treating material particulars as constituents of veridical experience is naïve realism's distinctive commitment. This commitment is intended to be a faithful reaction to at least one aspect of the transparency phenomenon: manifest presence (see Alston 1999, p. 182).⁶ In perception, material things seem to be dominant components of our subjective situation. Responding to this impression, naïve realism offers a view on which material particulars *are* dominant components of our subjective situation. All sides agree that when one sees an orange school bus, the bus is the object of one's experience. But this familiar terminology is inarticulate about the nature of one's subjective experiential state when one sees the bus. Naïve realism goes further and holds that the bus is a constituent of one's

⁶ For discussion of naïve realism and apparent absence, see section 3.1.

experience. Here the theory aims to achieve a good descriptive fit with the bus's dominant phenomenological presence to one. Naïve realism claims that other theories cannot match its level of descriptive accuracy.

Section 2.1

Representationalists and qualia theorists share a common commitment that opens them up to transparency-based criticism. In the next few sections I describe this common commitment, and then argue against representationalism and the qualia theory on the basis of their endorsement of it.

The common commitment is that material particulars are not constituent-objects of veridical experience. According to this picture of veridical experience, we do see tables and chairs, and thus sometimes these items are objects of veridical experience. But material objects manage this without being components of perceivers' subjective states. The particulars that we see in veridical experience stand in a non-constitutive relation to such experience. I will call any view that accepts this picture of veridical experience a form of **separatism about experience**.

What is the non-constitutive relation between material objects and experience that separatism envisions? For present purposes we can take this relation to be *causal*. Separatism finds expression in the familiar and widely prevalent causal approach to perception. On this familiar approach, in a subject's successful perception of a material object, the object properly causes the subject to have an experience. Here the object is not a constituent of the subject's experience; rather the object is wholly distinct from the subject's experience. For our purposes, the key commitment of this approach is *not* that causal links of some kind between subject and object are necessary for perception. Rather, the key commitment, and the one that brings along commitment to separatism, is the idea

that one relatum of the requisite causal relation is the subject's *experience*, conceived as wholly distinct from the material object that causes it. This conception of experience is the defining commitment of separatism.

Contemporary representationalism holds that experiences have representational content. It goes on to hold that this representational content fixes or determines the phenomenal character of experience (see Dretske 1995; Tye 1995, 2000). These are the two main claims of representationalism as I understand it. In this paper I focus on the idea that experiences have representational content.

There are, in turn, at least two ways of developing this idea. According to the first, the propositional content of experience is in some sense an object of experiential awareness. Here, one "sensorily entertains" the proposition in one's experience.⁷ On this way of developing representationalism, experience consists in the sensory entertaining (or apprehending, perhaps) of propositional contents. A representationalist of this first type holds that sensory experience is a two-place intentional relation to a proposition. I will refer to this version of representationalism as "representationalism₁."⁸ According to the second version of representationalism, the representational content of an experience is explicitly not an object of the experience. According to this view, the content of a token experience is associated with the experience in some other way. I will call this version of representationalism "representationalism₂."

In this section I focus on representationalism₁, and in subsequent sections I discuss representationalism₂. I turn now to filling out representationalism₁. Fred Dretske holds that the propositional contents of experience are "object-independent" or "object-neutral" with

⁷ For the "sensory entertainment" terminology, see Pautz 2007.

⁸ For clear endorsement of this theory, see Heck 2000, p. 509. Tim Crane sharply criticizes it in his 2006.

respect to material particulars in the world.⁹ These particulars have no influence on the contents of experience; they do not enter into these contents in any way. The contents of experience are merely general or existential. I do not attribute representationalism₁ to Dretske. Rather, I want to take representationalism₁ to incorporate Dretske's claim that the propositional contents of experience are object-independent. It is the "object-independent" version of representationalism₁ that I wish to discuss.

As introduced, representationalism₁ is committed to separatism about experience. First, representationalism₁ holds that experience is an intentional relation to propositions. Second, the propositions in question do not contain material particulars as constituents, nor do they determine such particulars in some other way. Material particulars are not constituent-objects of veridical experience.¹⁰

The phenomenological objection to representationalism₁ is as follows. Material particulars seem to have a more substantial presence to us in veridical experience than representationalism₁ allows. Suppose that I see a dark red fire hydrant from across a residential street. The fire hydrant is in a rectangle of well cut grass between the sidewalk and the street itself. Sunlight gives the fire hydrant and the grass a familiar shiny look. The light and the open suburban street create a setting in which the fire hydrant is right there for me to see it. Here, my awareness of the dark red fire hydrant does not seem to be

⁹ See Dretske 1995, pp. 23-27. Although Dretske describes perception as a form of "*de re*" representation, on his view the *de re* character of perception is not secured by the content of experience itself. Dretske is clear that "there is nothing in the content of [a perceptual] representation, nothing that the representation *says*, which makes it about this object rather than that object or no object at all" (p. 25). For this reason, and in this sense, I take Dretske to hold that the contents of experience are object-independent.

The object-independent version of representationalism has a prominent place in representationalism's recent history. In addition to Dretske, other advocates include Colin McGinn (1982), Martin Davies (1992), and "late-nineties" Michael Tye (1995, 2000).

¹⁰ Although representationalism₁ excludes material particulars from the propositional contents of experience, an advocate could hold that sensible properties are constituents of these contents. The resulting form of representationalism₁ is similar to the separatist "property-complex" view described and criticized in note 33, section 4.2. See also the surrounding main text. In this section I criticize a generic version of representationalism₁. The two discussions are, I think, complementary.

mediated or entirely displaced by a subjectively more fundamental awareness of an object-independent proposition. Manifest presence suggests that veridical experiences are intentional relations to material particulars, not relations to object-independent propositions.¹¹

Section 2.2

Before turning to representationalism₂, I will introduce the qualia theory. The qualia theory that I will discuss is an abstraction from the views of actual qualia theorists.¹²

Although the theory is an abstraction, it seems to embody ideas about experience that have had a significant impact on recent debate.

The qualia theory to be considered denies that the representational content of experience determines the phenomenal character of experience, contending instead that phenomenal character has another basis or source, in qualia. Qualia are properties of experience that determine the phenomenal character of experience. According to the qualia theory, two experiences with the same qualia cannot differ in phenomenal character.¹³

¹¹ My argument against representationalism₁ is similar to a criticism that William Alston brings against representationalism in his 2005 (pp. 275-276, see also 283-284). What I add to Alston is the point that our common criticism of representationalism builds on a feature of experience, transparency, to which representationalists have appealed for support.

¹² Proponents of the qualia theory include Sydney Shoemaker (1982, 1994, 2002), Ned Block (1990, 1996, 2003), and Brian Loar (2003). The qualia camp is diverse and evolving. In his 1994 Sydney Shoemaker holds that we are not directly aware of qualia in introspection. In his 2002, however, Shoemaker reverses his position on this point. In his 2003, Brian Loar develops a conception of qualia on which they are “intentional” in a certain sense.

Although Charles Siewert (2003) does not accept my main-text conception of qualia, I place him with qualia theorists for present purposes. (I discuss an idea from Siewert in section 2.3). Siewert’s primary theoretical tool is the phenomenal character of experience, rather than external-world objects of experience or experiential contents that are not grounded in phenomenal character itself (see also his 1998). Since Siewert’s conception of experience is similar to the qualia theory, and indeed closer to the qualia theory than it is to representationalism or naïve realism, I place Siewert in the large, inclusive qualia camp.

Despite these important departures (see also note 13), the qualia theory I introduce in the main text has some claim to standard-view status. See Stoljar 2004 (pp. 350-351), which develops a similar qualia theory (which Stoljar calls the “Shoemaker-Block view of qualia”) and ascribes it a similar status.

¹³ Christopher Peacocke (1983), who is often associated with the qualia theory, would not accept these main-text claims about qualia and phenomenal character. Peacocke argues that certain pairs of experiences have the same “sensational properties” while differing in phenomenal character (pp. 22-23). I record some doubt

Keeping in line with the qualia theory's opposition to representationalism, qualia are non-representational or non-intentional properties of experience.

Furthermore, qualia are "narrow" in the sense that physical duplicates cannot differ in their qualia. In addition, we can be directly aware of experiential qualia in introspection. Finally, the qualia theory is a form of separatism because it denies that material particulars are object-constituents of veridical experience. On this theory, the only constituents of experience are qualia and conscious subjects themselves. Some different views of the relationship between these constituents are explored in the discussion to follow.

As noted, qualia theorists hold that we can be directly aware of qualia when we introspect our experiences. It is a further, somewhat thorny question whether qualia are also available to us in experience: available to us when we *have* experiences, not simply when we *introspect* our experiences.¹⁴ Are qualia objects of experiential awareness? I will examine both options for the qualia theory. If we are experientially aware of qualia, then my objection is that they throw up a veil of perception. Since qualia determine the phenomenal character of experience, their presence to us as objects of experiential awareness would be comprehensive. Qualia would be found throughout one's entire visual field. But this consequent veil of perception compromises the manifest experiential presence of material things.

The second option for the qualia theory is that qualia are *not* objects of experiential awareness. On this view, although we are aware of qualia when we introspect, experience

about his argument, but this is not the crucial point for present purposes. Regardless of his view of phenomenal character, Peacocke's theory still fits the profile to which I object in this section. Since sensational properties would be found throughout one's visual field, they create a phenomenologically problematic veil of perception.

¹⁴ This issue is mentioned in Martin 2002, p. 383, n. 10.

itself does not involve awareness of any items or objects. This theory is importantly similar to representationalism₂.

According to representationalism₂, we should not think of the content of experience as an intermediate object of awareness in experience. We should not think of an experience's propositional content as an object of awareness at all. In experience, no mental arrow points at the proposition itself. The propositional content of an experience is simply associated with the experience in some other way. In contrast to representationalism₁, representationalism₂ does not treat the propositional contents of experience as objects of experiential awareness. This is the only difference between the two versions of representationalism.¹⁵ According to representationalism₂, experience itself does not involve awareness of any objects.¹⁶

Representationalism₂ and the second qualia theory are forms of separatism that reject act-object conceptions of experience itself. I will call these versions of the representationalist and qualia theories the #2 theories. In the next section, I argue against the #2 theories on "apparent absence" grounds.

¹⁵ Following representationalism₁, representationalism₂ has an object-independent conception of the content of experience, and is therefore a form of separatism.

¹⁶ The representationalism that Michael Martin discusses in his 2002 is similar to representationalism₂ (see especially p. 397). Martin's larger aim in his paper is to elaborate how transparency supports naïve realism. But his somewhat positive conception of representationalism takes his argument in a different direction from mine in this paper. Martin thinks that representationalism and naïve realism are at a standoff when it comes to *experiential* transparency: according to Martin, the phenomenon does not give either theory a comparative edge (pp. 397-402). For this reason, Martin develops an objection to representationalism based on an important analogue of experiential transparency, an analogue found in a cognate mental state, sensory imagination. My departure from Martin on transparency is that I try to show that representationalism is a bad fit with *experiential* transparency itself. I discuss other differences with Martin in section 4.2.

Section 2.3

I start with what seems to be a point of agreement amongst philosophers who write on transparency. My sources will be recent papers by Daniel Stoljar and Charles Siewert on Harman and Tye's recent transparency-based argument against qualia.

In his paper, Stoljar sets out the Harman-Tye argument and critiques it. Stoljar identifies one premise (which I rename here) of the argument as follows:

(T) In introspection, one is, or becomes, aware of the intrinsic features of one's experience *by attending to the objects and properties represented by that experience* (Stoljar 2004, p. 356).

Stoljar's terminology --- intrinsic features, represented properties --- need not distract us from (T)'s basic idea: that one is or becomes aware of one's experience by attending to the objects of one's experience.

Since Stoljar's statement of the transparency argument self-consciously involves some reconstruction, it is not clear that Harman and Tye would accept (T) as stated. But I'm not going to worry about this. (T) seems to be consonant with their discussions. And importantly, Stoljar accepts (T), at least for the purposes of evaluating the transparency argument against qualia. What Stoljar contests is the Harman-Tye *inference* from (T) to the conclusion that we are not directly aware of properties of our experiences.

In his 2003 paper, Charles Siewert's opposition to Harman and Tye takes a similar form. Siewert's benchmark principle (which I rename here) is

(T*) You cannot attend to how it appears to you, by turning your attention *away from* something that appears to you, and *towards* your experience (Siewert 2003, p. 35).

I don't claim that (T) and (T*) are equivalent principles. I merely suggest that they lean in the same direction. What Stoljar and Siewert appear to accept is that one's experiential awareness of an object serves as some sort of anchor for one's awareness of one's

experience. If opponents of Harman and Tye have some sympathy for this idea, then it seems to be a point of agreement in the recent discussion of transparency, or it is as close to such agreement as we are going to get.

Here I want to make a phenomenological point that builds on (T) and (T*). Even if we follow the guidelines implicit in these principles, our experiences will not magically appear to us in dramatic, arresting fashion. Adapting an example from Michael Martin (2002, pp. 380-381), our experiences can be elements of different overall attitudes and projects. You can see a bush at the end of your street and think nothing of it. But you can also look at the bush, and, in so doing, think about your current situation as a perceiver. In the second case, let us suppose, you are aware of your experience. But in this case, even if you carefully follow the (T)/(T*) strictures, you will not be aware of your experience as a phenomenologically distinct item. Your experience won't suddenly pop onto the stage, in a way that might make you say, "Oh, *there* it is!" Again, when you are aware of your experience of the bush, it will not be as though the object of your experience, the bush, is on the *right*, and your experience of the bush is on the *left*. You won't be able to selectively focus on your experience, as opposed to the object of the experience, the bush. Experience simply doesn't have that sort of profile.

Experience has no presence to us distinct from the presence of its objects. Here I go beyond (T) and (T*) by making an explicit claim about the phenomenological nature of introspective success. The end result of introspective success --- the state of being aware of one's experience --- is not a state in which one is presented with a

phenomenologically distinctive item, one's experience, to which one can selectively attend.¹⁷

For this reason, the #2 theories introduced in the last section clash sharply with the apparent nature of veridical experience. Here I object straightforwardly to the #2 theories' commitment to separatism. Recall that on this view of perception, material objects cause us to have wholly distinct experiences. However, we cannot effect this separation of experience from object in introspection. We can't isolate the experiential states that are supposed to fall short of the material objects of which we are aware. In veridical experience, we are aware of material particulars in a way that leaves us with no independent angle on our experiences themselves. The #2 theories reject the idea that material objects are object-constituents of veridical experience, but this opposition leaves them sharply at odds with the apparent nature of such experience.

We have looked at several forms of representationalism and the qualia theory. Their common phenomenological liability stems from what they make available, within experience, to perceiving subjects. The first versions of representationalism and the qualia theory take experience itself, one's subjective state, to involve awareness of propositional contents or qualia. These act-object theories of experience posit objects which clash with our first-person impression of veridical experience. By contrast, the #2 theories do not invoke intermediate objects of awareness. However, since they remain committed to separatism, their abstention does not increase their affinity with the transparency of experience.

¹⁷ Similar claims can be found in Siewert 2003, pp. 36-37.

All the theories considered do not bring material objects within the structure of a perceiver's subjective state. This omission is their common separatist commitment, and the source of their common phenomenological problem.

Perhaps I can clarify my argument by turning to the familiar notion of direct awareness. Since the #2 theories do not posit intermediate objects of awareness, they hold that material particulars are the sole objects of perception. On their views, we can reasonably think of our awareness of these objects as direct. Thus it might appear that the #2 theories can accommodate the transparency phenomenon while rejecting naïve realism.

Invoking direct awareness does not improve the #2 intuitive profile. As noted, the #2 theories posit a merely causal connection between our experiences and their external-world objects. They hold that external objects operate at one remove, by causing us to have wholly distinct experiences. But that is not how it appears to work. The objects we perceive seem to bear a much tighter connection to our experiences of them. Transparency challenges separatism's metaphysics of experience, its account of experiential subjectivity. The terminology of direct awareness does not engage these topics. That is why it is available to some versions of separatism, and why it fails to provide a rescue.

Section 3.1

According to the naïve realist, veridical experiences (“v-experiences” in the next few paragraphs) are not distinct from their objects, material particulars and their perceptible properties. Veridical experiences form an intentional, relational unity with their objects. This conception of veridical experience explains our inability to introspectively attend to v-experience as a phenomenologically separate item. V-experience is not a *phenomenologically* separate item because it is not a *metaphysically* separate item. V-experience does not show up as a distinct object of attention simply because it, qua

subjective state, is not a distinct element in one's overall perceptual situation. The naïve view predicts our inability to attend to something both (a) subjective and (b) wholly distinct from the objects of v-experience. On the naïve account there is nothing in one's perceptual situation that corresponds to this description.

However, we need not conclude that we are not aware of our v-experiences. Naïve realism can make the following regulative suggestion regarding our awareness of v-experience. V-experience is not literally absent. Rather, its presence to us reflects its relational, world-involving nature. Since v-experience is relational, it has no presence to us distinct from the presence of its objects. However, since the world is a part of v-experience, then one part of such experience --- namely the world --- does show up to us quite vividly. The ready availability of the objects of experience is also, in part, the ready availability of the experience itself. According to the naïve theory, we can be aware of our v-experiences. The presence of the object does not amount to the absence of the experience.

The contrary thought, that we cannot be aware of our experiences, is a product of separatist assumptions about the structure of experience. (For separatism, see section 2.1). If we assume that v-experience is a mental state wholly distinct from its external-world objects, the apparent absence of this mental state from our subjective lives is a real oddity. This oddity motivates doubts about our awareness of our experiences. However, the separatist assumption that generates the oddity is out of step with our headline phenomenon. Naïve realism rejects the separatist assumption, resolves the oddity, and obviates the motivation behind recent attacks on our awareness of experience.

Naïve realism respects the transparency phenomenon, while preserving the innocuous idea that we can be aware of our experiences. Other theories cannot claim the

same advantages. Since representationalists and qualia theorists recognize the transparency phenomenon as an important feature of experience, the challenge that stems from this phenomenon is especially damaging to them.

Section 3.2

In this section I outline how my argument from veridical transparency avoids recent criticisms of other arguments claiming support from the same source. I begin by scrutinizing my claim that qualia theorists, along with representationalists, agree that transparency is an important feature of experience. Is this right? Don't qualia theorists reject the idea that experience is transparent? In order to sort this out, we should remember a distinction from section 1.1, the distinction between the transparency phenomenon and transparency claims. The qualia theorist rejects the representationalist's transparency *claims*. As we have seen (section 2.3), these claims are along the following lines: we are not directly aware of qualities of our experiences, we are not aware of qualities of our experiences, etc. Stoljar and Siewert argue that the transparency *phenomenon* does not actually support the representationalist claims. Their critique recognizes the existence and evidential status of the phenomenon. Thus, at least some qualia theorists think that the transparency phenomenon is important.¹⁸

However, in contrast with the representationalist development of transparency, I do not attack our awareness of our experiences (see section 3.1). I do reject qualia, but via other routes (see sections 2.2 and 2.3). As a result the Stoljar-Siewert response to representationalism is inapplicable, and my argument against qualia stands.

¹⁸ See also Sydney Shoemaker (1994). For my present-purposes classification of Charles Siewert as a qualia theorist, see note 12 of this paper.

In a recent paper, Alex Byrne and Heather Logue contend that naïve-realist arguments from the transparency of experience are incoherent. They write:

the usual transparency claim is that in undergoing a sense experience, one is never aware *of* the experience itself --- if one is aware of any events at all, they are events in one's environment, like flashes and bangs, not events in the head. Indeed --- as stressed in Dretske (2003) --- transparency makes it extremely hard to see how one knows that one has experiences in the first place. But at the very least, the transparency of experience fits nicely with the view that in having an experience of, say, a tomato, although one may be in position to learn something about the essence of the *tomato*, one is not in position to learn much of anything about the essence of the *experience* (Byrne and Logue 2008, p. 82).

Consequently, Byrne and Logue go on to write,

Transparency goes naturally with *modesty about experience* --- we know little of the nature of experiential episodes. What's more, it goes naturally with *scepticism about experience* --- there are no experiential episodes to begin with. Hence, naïve realism, in so far as it is motivated by transparency, is a position with some serious internal tensions (p. 83).

The apparent problem for naïve realism is that its transparency argument cites a certain fact as a cornerstone of first-person support, when the fact actually indicates that we lack the type of first-person access to experience on which the naïve realist intends to rely. So characterized this does look like a self-defeating line of argument. This is the problem for naïve realism that Byrne and Logue intend to bring out.

In response we must again distinguish between transparency claims and the transparency phenomenon. The linchpin of the Byrne-Logue objection is a certain transparency claim: in undergoing a sense experience, one is never aware of the experience itself. As I have stressed, I reject this claim. I describe the transparency phenomenon in terms of the notions of manifest presence and apparent absence. I argue that the phenomenon so understood supports naïve realism. And I suggest that naïve realism can accept and indeed elucidate the idea that we are aware of our experiences. My

understanding of transparency rejects the linchpin transparency claim and thus avoids the internal tension that Byrne and Logue attribute to naïve realism.

In the next two sections I discuss hallucination, perhaps the main historical and contemporary source of opposition to naïve realism.

Section 4.1

I begin with an admittedly lengthy development of my section 1.2 claims about phenomenology and phenomenal character. The concept of phenomenal character does not feature within my statement of naïve realism's main claim, that material objects and their perceptible properties are constituent-objects of veridical experience. On my version of naïve realism, phenomenal character comes in at a later stage of theorizing.¹⁹ The naïve-realist conception of the structure of experience constrains a theorist's options on the topic of phenomenal character (cf. section 4.2). But phenomenal character does not have a vital place within the workings of the theory.

This point marks an important difference with representationalists and qualia theorists, who are primarily interested in the phenomenal character of experience. The issue that drives the R/Q debate is the nature or status of phenomenal character. For this reason, representationalism and the qualia theory are often described as theories of phenomenal character (Tye 2000, Block 2003, Stoljar 2004). The R/Q interest in phenomenal character is in part a product of their debate's continuity with ongoing discussions of the challenges that phenomenal character presents to physicalism and functionalism (cf. Harman 1990, Block 2003). Our concept of phenomenal character

¹⁹ Other discussions of naïve realism give phenomenal character a more prominent place. See, e.g., Martin 1997, 2004, 2006. Thus when I describe "naïve realism" in this paper I do not speak for all naïve realists. I interact with some of Martin's ideas in the next section.

seems to be rich enough to get the latter discussions going. The centrality of phenomenal character in these discussions leads R/Q theorists to examine the structure of experience.

By contrast, naïve realism is interested in the structure of experience at the outset, in a setting where phenomenal character does not define the problem. We can distinguish between the broadly evidential inputs to a theory and a theory's doctrinal outputs. As indicated above, claims about phenomenal character are derivative outputs of naïve theory. This is one reason why it is misleading to describe naïve realism as *a theory of phenomenal character*. This characterization exaggerates the place that phenomenal character has on the output side of the naïve-realist theory. The preceding characterization also overstates phenomenal character's importance on the "input" side of naïve realism. The naïve theory's main aim is not adherence to the phenomenal character of experience. I will try to clarify this point by arguing that phenomenological study draws on more than just the phenomenal character of experience.

The view that I reject is that phenomenal character is the fulcrum point of phenomenological theorizing. On this view, phenomenological study reacts to, and is measured against, phenomenal character, and that's it. Phenomenal character is the sole experiential input to phenomenological study. I will call this picture of phenomenological study the Closed Circle view.

Closed Circle does not enjoy clear support within the recent transparency discussion. Within the R/Q debate, our experiential awareness of public objects and properties is a phenomenological given, a starting point from which debate about our awareness of experience proceeds. However, the Closed Circle model of phenomenological study is not absent from the contemporary philosophical landscape. The model is promoted by the current tendency to treat "phenomenology" and "phenomenal

character” as synonymous terms. (Here we speak of the “phenomenology” of a token experience, or we say that two experiences “have the same phenomenology”). As I see it, this tendency is not a healthy influence. The Closed Circle view of the relationship between phenomenological study and phenomenal character has two related problems.

First, the concept of phenomenal character fits badly with the nature of two elements, manifest presence and apparent absence, of presumptive phenomenological relevance. (See section 1.2). This is one reason to think that the property of phenomenal character does not have a monopoly on phenomenological study. Second, the mechanics envisioned by Closed Circle are implausible. On the Closed Circle model, the phenomenologist isolates the phenomenal character of his experiences so as to identify the sole experiential basis of his subsequent theorizing. But one moral (section 2.3) of the recent transparency discussion is that the powers of selective attention envisioned here are not widely dispersed.

I think, then, that we have to recognize the objects and properties we encounter in perception as legitimate phenomenological inputs. Opposing the Closed Circle model, these inputs are not filtered up through the channel of phenomenal character. We don’t take in phenomenal characters and treat them as clues about other aspects of experience. Perceived objects have a direct impact on phenomenological theorizing.

Before discussing this point in connection with hallucinations, I will sketch a model of phenomenological study that coheres with it. We have perceptual recognitional abilities that allow us to knowledgeably classify things when we see them.²⁰ Many of these abilities are mundane; some are more specialized. For instance, I can visually recognize

²⁰ Different varieties of perceptual recognitional abilities have recently been discussed by, e.g., Loar 1990/1997, McDowell 1994, and Millar 2007, 2008, forthcoming.

Ellie as a dog and, more specifically, as a chocolate Labrador. Focusing on the latter form of recognition, we can describe the operative ability in the following fashion. I have the concept of a chocolate Labrador, and my possession of this concept has a perceptual component. On the basis of perceptual input, I can reliably identify positive and negative instances of the property, being a chocolate Labrador, to which the concept refers.

I can't do this in every environment or situation. Some possible environments contain very similar-looking breeds, or contain too many fake Labradors. In these and other unfavorable environments, I lack the ability to tell by looking that an animal is a chocolate Labrador.²¹ But in my current environment, I do possess this ability, and its exercise within this environment allows me to recognize chocolate Labradors. When I see Ellie, my perceptual recognition of her breed triggers the knowledgeable judgment that she is a chocolate Labrador.

In addition to the concept of a chocolate Labrador, I also have the concept of an object of visual awareness. My possession of this concept has a perceptual component. On the basis of perceptual input, I can reliably identify instances of the property, being an object of visual awareness, to which the concept refers. The most relevant recognitions are first-person attributions. In these cases, I perceptually recognize items as objects of my current visual awareness. An example would be a case in which I visually recognize Ellie the dog as the object of my current visual awareness. On the basis of perceptual input, I judge that Ellie is the object of my current visual awareness. My judgment is not inferred from premises. Rather, the judgment is the product of first-person attunement to how the object-of-awareness property figures in my own perceptual life.

²¹ Here my discussion of recognitional abilities follows Millar.

Many people possess such attunement. As before, however, this recognitional capacity is not present in all environments or situations. For example, let's assume that the type of visual awareness currently under discussion is distinct from dreaming and sensory imagination. If a subject frequently had quite vivid dreams, or if he possessed a runaway visual imagination, then he might not be able to tell by looking that something is an object of his visual awareness.²² But, in favorable circumstances, subjects can possess this perceptual capacity and can use it to knowledgeably recognize things as the objects of their current visual awareness.

I have described our ability to perceptually recognize kind properties, and our ability to perceptually recognize a more complex object-of-awareness property. The fusion of these abilities allows subjects to perceptually recognize public physical particulars as the objects of their visual awareness. A very close analogue of these abilities, which links the same recognitional sensitivities to a related concept, is the ability to perceptually recognize that one is *seeing* a public object. Someone who deploys this analogue ability can have first-person knowledge that he is seeing a particular public object. I briefly explore this point in footnotes.²³

What I suggest here is that the abilities discussed in the last few paragraphs ground a central form of phenomenological study. Consider a case where we perceptually recognize the kind of a suitable material particular, such as a chocolate Labrador, and we also recognize the particular as the object of our current visual awareness. Focusing on the

²² According to some accounts of hallucination, hallucinating subjects are aware of nothing at all. I explore a different theory of hallucination in the next section. For brief discussion of this theory in connection with recognitional abilities, see note 26.

²³ See again note 26. A brief comment here is that I describe recognition-based knowledge as "first-person" for two reasons. First, such knowledge results from a subject's non-inferential reaction to perceptual input, a reaction triggered by the relevant recognitional ability. (On the non-inferential character of recognitional knowledge, see Millar). Second, the phenomenon of perceptually recognizing instances of properties has a clear first-person, subjective component.

second condition, in this case we are aware of a particular as having a certain property, *as being* the current object of our visual awareness. Schematically, we are aware of a certain *event*, an object's possession of a property (again, the property of being the object of our current visual awareness).

Subjects pursue phenomenological study through their first-person awareness of these events. This first-person awareness is predominantly perceptual. It is analogous to my perceptual awareness of Ellie's breed. Awareness of a Labrador's status as object of one's current visual awareness is visual awareness of the Labrador that is informed by certain abilities and interests. On my view, phenomenological study has some texture, but not an ungainly structure.

Suppose a subject has first-person awareness of the event of a Labrador's being the object of his current visual awareness. The subject can take this event-awareness in a couple of directions. He can offer intuitive descriptions of the event. In this paper, I have described such events in terms of the manifest presence of objects, and the apparent absence of experience. In addition to offering descriptions of the event of which he is aware, our hypothetical subject can also ask related questions: what is the best theoretical characterization of this event? What theoretical account fits best with my first-person impression of this event? Here, having achieved awareness of a certain event, the subject goes on to consider the descriptive aptness of theoretical concepts as applied to this event. In our context, the concepts whose suitability we consider are philosophical concepts like the concepts of representation, qualia, and at least one more concept, to which we shall shortly turn.

This conception of phenomenological study does not presuppose naïve realism. According to this conception, the basic phenomenological state involves awareness of a

public object's possession of a property. However, this approach to phenomenology does not settle the question of our experiential relation to material particulars when we perceive them. One of the concepts up for assignment (or rejection) in phenomenological study is the concept of conscious, subjective experience. Drawing on manifest presence and apparent absence, naïve realists argue that the best theoretical move is to extend experience, in the relevant cases, all the way out to the external objects that we perceptually apprehend.

My argument from veridical transparency is not routed through the phenomenal character of experience. The notions of manifest presence and apparent absence reflect the perceptual presence of material particulars as we see them with certain interests and concepts in mind.

Let's turn, finally, to hallucination. The point that my argument is not routed through phenomenal character reduces the naïve realist's exposure to traditional challenges. A main challenge stems from the familiar idea that veridical experience and hallucinations can have the same phenomenal character. Let's accept this idea and call it PI. In conjunction with the earlier-described Closed Circle conception of phenomenology, PI has a significant effect on the naïve-realism debate. The conjunction of PI and Closed Circle negates the possibility of cogent phenomenological arguments for naïve realism. This conjunction casts the naïve realist as offering *differential* treatments of veridical experience and hallucination on the basis of the *same* phenomenal characters. That is not a compelling project. Contrary, perhaps, to common belief on the matter, it is not the naïve-realist project either. Since Closed Circle is implausible, the alleged problem for naïve realism simply does not arise.

Bereft of its Closed Circle partner, PI does not undermine naïve realism's argument from veridical transparency. As we have seen, the limits of the concept of phenomenal character take the naïve realist in a different direction. As a result, the "common phenomenal character" challenge does not pick out a property central to naïve realism. By drawing on the perceptual presence of material objects, naïve realism draws on a base that distinguishes perception from hallucination.

Section 4.2

Although naïve realism can draw support from its argument from veridical transparency, the theory can lock in its gains only by offering an adequate account of links between veridical experience and hallucinatory experience. In lieu of a novel account, or even a full treatment of someone else's account, I will try to use the preceding discussion of transparency to defend Mark Johnston's treatment of hallucinations from a challenge to its naïve-realist credentials.

Johnston describes seeing as a "mental act" that directly relates subjects to external particulars and their visible features (2004, pp. 137, 139). Johnston opposes separatism.²⁴ For these reasons I take Johnston to be a naïve realist. However, Johnston defends a "common-factor" account of veridical experience and hallucination.

Johnston holds that some of the items of which we are aware in veridical experience are also present to us in hallucination. We can see the red Hummer vehicle and in doing so be aware of its red color. In this case we are aware of a material particular and one of its sensible properties. According to Johnston, we can also be visually aware of this

²⁴ See Johnston's opposition to the Conjunctive Analysis of perception (cf. 2004, 114-115), which is similar to the separatist outlook that I have discussed. As far as I can tell, separatism is a more inclusive position: every Conjunctive theory describes our awareness of material particulars as "indirect," but this is not a consequence of every separatist theory. For discussion of this point, see section 2.3.

property, and other sensible properties, when they are uninstantiated. Johnston's view is that in hallucination, we are aware of complexes of uninstantiated sensible properties (2004, pp. 134-136). Simplifying, Johnston's proposal is that hallucinating subjects are aware of uninstantiated complexes of shape, size, and color properties. When we see, we are aware of a material particular which instantiates a complex of sensible (and sensed) properties. When we hallucinate, we are merely aware of a complex of uninstantiated sensible properties. Johnston explains the metaphysical possibility of "subjectively seamless transitions" (p. 114) between token veridical and hallucinatory experiences in terms of partial overlap in the items presented to subjects in each experience.^{25, 26}

Johnston's important suggestion is that since his key explanatory items, complexes of sensible properties, are already part of a naïve-realist account of veridical experience, we can employ them as objects of hallucination without compromising our naïve-realist credentials. However, we might worry that Johnston's robust common factor engenders

²⁵ In his paper, Johnston discusses additional features of hallucinations that his theory can explain (see 2004, pp. 127-134).

²⁶ According to Johnston, hallucinations involve objects of awareness. Returning to the previous section's topic, a subject could correctly apply the concept of an object of awareness in cases of hallucination. The mistake that a subject makes in these cases concerns what he takes himself to be aware of, not the question of whether he is aware of anything. On my view, the recognitional abilities discussed in section 4.1 interact with hallucinations in the following fashion. A subject who has frequent hallucinations (perhaps of a very realistic, convincing type), or a subject for whom hallucinations are especially likely, will not be able to tell by looking whether or not he is visually aware of a *material particular*. The specific salience of hallucinations for this subject is what blocks his possession of this recognitional ability.

However, conceptually competent subjects who are not prone to hallucination are, when they are not hallucinating, able to visually recognize material particulars *as such* as objects of their visual awareness. These subjects can know, on recognitional grounds, that they are seeing public objects. My claims here are compatible with the metaphysical possibility of "matching" hallucinations. The key point is that generic statements of this possibility exaggerate subjects' epistemic limitations with respect to their actual-world veridical experiences. For many subjects, the possible hallucinatory experiences that perfectly match their actual-world veridical experiences, and the scenarios in which they enjoy subjectively seamless transitions, are too unlikely, too far off in modal space, to prevent subjects from perceptually recognizing their actual-world veridical experiences for what they are. This claim is consonant with recent discussions of recognitional abilities (see again Millar). The claim also has some affinity with recent epistemological discussions which link knowledge with the modal notion of "safety" (Sosa 1999, Williamson 2000).

conflict with naïve realism's main claims.²⁷ Although Michael Martin's (2004) does not discuss Johnston specifically, I believe we can profitably use his paper to bring out the relevant concerns about Johnston's theory.

Martin sees a "common factor" commitment as potentially quite debilitating to naïve realism. He writes

To deny that what is present in perception is present in hallucination is quite consistent with admitting that what is present in hallucination is also present in perception... But is the position a coherent resting place? For there is a lingering worry that once one admits that the hallucinatory [element] is common to the two situations, one undermines the motivations for disjunctivism in the first place by making the non-common element redundant to the explanation of the phenomenal aspects of experience (Martin 2004, p. 59).

The motivations for disjunctivism are to preserve naïve realism (Martin 2004, p. 38). In my discussion of Martin and Johnston, I will take Martin's "phenomenal aspects" to refer to the phenomenal character of experience.²⁸

Johnston's theory fits the model that excites Martin's concern. Within Johnston's theory, the "non-common element" in veridical experience is a subject's awareness of a *material particular*. Material particulars do not play a role in Johnston's account of the phenomenal character of experience. In a comment that is largely an aside, Johnston writes, "There are no qualia. It is ordinary qualities and complexes involving them that account for the so-called subjective character of experience" (Johnston 2004, p. 146). It appears that Johnston's view is that the phenomenal character of one's experience, veridical or otherwise, is fixed by the perceptible properties of which one is aware in the

²⁷ In addition to the material from Michael Martin discussed in the main text, a referee pressed this doubt about Johnston's theory. See also Dunn 2008, which is a critique of Johnston's theory. The material in this section relates to some of Dunn's concerns.

²⁸ For discussion of Martin and phenomenal character, see note 39 of this paper.

experience. Two experiences that involve the same “property-awareness” cannot vary in phenomenal character.²⁹

On the one hand, Martin’s worry is extremely general, voicing fear about the detrimental effects of any common element at all. On the other hand, Martin’s conception of naïve realism is very narrow, holding that the viability of this theory is tied to our ability to explain the phenomenal aspects of experience in terms of the metaphysical element that is unique to veridical perception. But why should we think this way?

One thought might be that naïve realism’s claims of first-person support (Martin 2002, 2004, p. 42) establish a broadly epistemic obligation to the phenomenal character of experience. This is a thought about the advertised epistemic profile of the theory. If naïve realists appeal to phenomenal character for support, they must justify their “constituent” view about material particulars in terms of phenomenal character. This is a plausible constraint. Applying it, the charge against Johnston is that he severs explanatory links between material particulars and phenomenal character.

Note well then that Johnston does not incur an epistemic obligation to phenomenal character. Apart from the previous quotation, Johnston says virtually nothing about phenomenal character.³⁰ It appears that he simply doesn’t use the phrase “phenomenal character.” Although Johnston claims phenomenological support for his theory (pp. 120, 150-155, 169), Johnston-style naïve realism does not measure itself against the phenomenal character of experience. In this paper, I have tried to develop this form of naïve realism. I have argued for the theory on grounds besides phenomenal character, and

²⁹ Although I work with Johnston’s account of phenomenal character for present purposes, I don’t think that “properties-only” theories of phenomenal character can explain phenomenological aspects of perceptual constancy. In Kennedy 2007, I defend a theory of perceptual constancy which includes a more complex account of phenomenal character, an account that remains compatible with naïve realism.

³⁰ Johnston also refers to the “character” of example mental acts on pp. 116, 128 of his 2004.

I have argued against the model of phenomenological study that sets phenomenal character as our guiding metric. The phenomenological ambitions of naïve realism do not tie its fate to phenomenal character. Accordingly the fact that Johnston ties phenomenal character to something besides material particulars does not compromise the phenomenological support that naïve realism aims to produce.

A related reaction to Johnston's theory may be that, once we accept the theory, we must accept that sensible properties "crowd out" the material particulars that instantiate them. Johnston's theory indicates that complexes of sensible properties are the primary objects of veridical experience. I agree that if Johnston's theory has this consequence, then the theory is inimical to naïve realism.

Crowding out seems to be a phenomenological notion, a notion that turns our attention to our perceptual lives. So directed, however, I don't think that we can deliver the idea that sensible properties crowd out the particulars that instantiate them without relying on the concept of phenomenal character. We can say, *since* perceptible properties fix the phenomenal character of experience, they crowd out material particulars. But this inference is the only way to create a phenomenological problem for naïve realism. Outside of the mindset that treats phenomenal character as the metric, there is no reason to think that perceptible properties trump the particulars that instantiate them. Let's consider some examples.

My glasses case has a silvery gray color. This color qualifies the surface of the case without occluding or obscuring the case itself. Over towards the corner of my tabletop, the case is right there to be seen. Taking another example, one wall in my apartment is made of brick. When I look at the wall, the sandy red color of the bricks does not form

part of a phenomenal phalanx that falls between me and the wall. Again, the wall is right there to be seen. Arguing for the same point, Johnston writes

In seeing Lucca as an Italian greyhound sitting under the desk I am aware of Lucca instantiating a certain sensible profile. Structured and merely qualitative parts of that same sensible profile can also be given to me in hallucination, but there is no sense in which they are given to me more directly than Lucca is when I see her... The objects seen --- instantiations of sensible profiles --- are not “indirect” objects of awareness in the fashion of the Conjunctive Analysis. When we see them, our awareness of them is not mediated by anything of which we are more directly aware (p. 137).³¹

The naïve realist does not need to argue that material particulars trump their sensible properties. All we need to do is resist the converse idea. We do this by challenging the pro-phenomenal ideology that gives rise to it. Without recourse to this ideology, naive realism’s view that material particulars are constituents of veridical experience is the best option.^{32, 33}

Another thought that might motivate Martin’s worry is that the metaphysical ambitions of naïve realists lead to claims that Johnston’s view does not allow them to make (cf. Martin 2004, pp. 61, 64). Naïve realism is a theory about the nature of conscious experience. However, Johnston’s claim about phenomenal character leaves out

³¹ For the Conjunctive Analysis referred to in the above quotation, see pp. 114-115 of Johnston’s paper. In the quotation, Johnston describes Lucca’s breed because he holds that kind-properties are parts of the sensible profiles that we see in veridical experience (but not in hallucination) (see pp. 135-137). According to Johnston, at least some kind properties are presented to us in veridical experience (pp. 149-150, 155). For main-text purposes I suppress this aspect of Johnston’s view, but I note its relevance to my discussion of recognitional abilities. The issue of whether a proponent of recognitional abilities has to take on Johnston’s picture is beyond the scope of this paper.

³² For more extensive discussion of trumping, see Johnston 2004, pp. 148-155. Johnston also links the trumping intuition to a phenomenal-priority thesis, a thesis that he calls the Phenomenal Bottleneck Principle (p. 151). For critical but ultimately sympathetic discussion of Johnston on this principle, see Hilbert 2004, pp. 187-189.

³³ The idea that we are aware of sensible properties in both veridical experience and hallucination can be developed in different ways. One might simply hold that experience in general consists in the awareness of properties. See Forrest 2005. This property-complex theory is coherent but Johnston’s naïve-realist alternative is preferable. There is no reason to elevate properties over objects in the structure of veridical experience. Forrest does not argue against the naïve-realist alternative.

material particulars, items that have an important place in naïve ideology. Therefore Johnston's claim does not realize or validate this ideology.

This line of thought identifies conscious experience with phenomenal character, or at least holds that their respective natures cannot outstrip each other. However, we can challenge this conception of the relationship between conscious experience and phenomenal character. Regarding phenomenal character, this property has no distinct presence to us,³⁴ and the corresponding concept has significant descriptive limitations. My arguments against the phenomenological primacy of phenomenal character create room for the idea that this property does not cut conscious subjectivity at the joints.

Johnston-type naïve realism takes up this idea. On this view, the property of phenomenal character does not determine the core conscious nature of all conscious states. Rather, a state's core conscious nature depends on the full relational nature of the state. A Johnston-style naïve realist holds that the full relational natures of veridical experience and hallucination are different. Like other naïve realists, I posit a link between a perceived particular and the perceiver's conscious state. The particular is a constituent of the perceiver's conscious state, and thus, it is part of the core conscious nature of the state. Johnston's common factor, awareness of sensible properties, does not exhaust the core conscious nature of veridical experience. Veridical experience and hallucination are different kinds of conscious state, although they overlap in nature.³⁵ Johnston's view does not subvert key naïve-realist claims.

³⁴ This claim about phenomenal character, a property of experience, follows from my section 2.3 claim that experience has no presence to us distinct from the presence of its objects. If we could selectively attend to the phenomenal character of experience, then we could selectively attend to experience, via selective attention to one of its properties.

³⁵ Johnston's terminology is different but in the same spirit. Although Johnston is not completely insistent on this point, he classifies acts of awareness in terms of *all* the items present to a subject in a given act. This

Michael Martin advocates “radical disjunctivism,” a form of naïve realism that holds that veridical experience and hallucination have no significant mental properties in common.³⁶ Separatism is associated with the claim that veridical experience and hallucination have *all* of their mental properties in common. Johnston is a naïve realist who holds that veridical experience and hallucination have *some* of their significant mental properties in common. Johnston can appear to offer an unworkable compromise.³⁷ Since radical disjunctivism and separatism emphasize different facts about experience,³⁸ it may seem that we can’t preserve the descriptive virtues of both theories by landing in the middle. Perhaps it is naïve realism that loses out. As against this assessment, according to my reading of Johnston, he does not defend a simple compromise theory. Johnston does not try to reconcile radical disjunctivism and separatism while retaining their view of the territory. In addition to taking ideas and goals from both sides, Johnston also rejects something that both sides share. This is commitment to the conceptual and metaphysical centrality of phenomenal character. Regarding separatism, as we have seen, phenomenal character is the central object of dispute in the debate between representationalists and qualia theorists. Phenomenal character is also an important topic for Martin.³⁹ On one classification, radical disjunctivism and separatism line up together, with Johnston taking the opposing view. This point should be part of our interpretation of Johnston, and part of

taxonomy, combined with Johnston’s theory of experience, treats veridical experience and hallucination as different types of mental acts (pp. 116-117, 138, 150-151, 170-171).

³⁶ See Martin 2004, 2006.

³⁷ This is Dunn’s assessment (2008, p. 393).

³⁸ Roughly, radical disjunctivism emphasizes the transparency of veridical experience, while separatism emphasizes the possibility of hallucinations that match veridical experiences. This characterization does not, of course, exhaust the full case for either side.

³⁹ Martin engages challenges that are pitched in terms of phenomenal character and the related notion of phenomenal consciousness. See the explanatory redundancy concern from Martin 2004 discussed in this paper, and the discussion of disjunctivism and phenomenal consciousness in his 2006. Martin states key disjunctivist claims in terms of phenomenal character (2006, p. 369), and indicates in other places that phenomenal character is an important target (1997, pp. 83-84, 89).

our assessment of his theory's shape and viability. The point is, I think, a favorable one.

Worries about Johnston's naïve-realist credentials flow from the mindset that he opposes, and that this paper attacks.

Section 5.1

I have argued that the transparency phenomenon supports naïve realism over its rivals, representationalism and the qualia theory, and that related points about phenomenology and phenomenal character diminish naïve realism's exposure to the argument from hallucination, and should enhance our sense of the options available to the naïve realist for responding to this argument.*

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