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### **Visual Awareness of Properties**

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I defend a view of the structure of visual property-awareness by considering the phenomenon of perceptual constancy. I argue that visual property-awareness is a three-place relation between a subject, a property, and a manner of presentation. Manners of presentation mediate our visual awareness of properties without being objects of visual awareness themselves. I provide criteria of identity for manners of presentation, and I argue that our ignorance of their intrinsic nature does not compromise the viability of a theory that employs them. In closing, I argue that the proposed manners of presentation are consistent with key direct-realist claims about the structure of visual awareness.

A traditional question in the debate about the structure of visual awareness concerns the nature of our awareness of external things, especially our awareness of material particulars.<sup>1</sup> Direct and indirect realism give opposing answers to this question. My topic in this paper, the structure of visual property-awareness, is a different, though clearly related, concern. It is connected to the debate about material particulars because visual object-awareness and property-awareness only rarely come apart. We see material particulars as having properties, properties such as color, shape, and size. For this reason, a complete treatment of our visual awareness of material particulars must discuss property-awareness, its structure, and its interrelations with our awareness of material particulars.

However, property-awareness is a partly autonomous topic because there are phenomenological features of property-awareness as such that make its structure philosophically interesting. The main features in question are forms of perceptual constancy, which I will discuss below. If we turn to these features, we find a genuine sense in which visual awareness of properties is mediated. I shall argue that a proper

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<sup>1</sup> My talk of the structure of visual awareness may assign a novel name to a familiar topic. Sense-datum theorists, adverbialists, and those who analyze experience in terms of representational content have different views of what I call the structure of visual awareness, or, equivalently in my usage, the structure of visual experience.

understanding of property-awareness recognizes some mediation. But, connecting back to direct realism, the mediation I shall advocate is compatible with main direct-realist claims about our visual awareness of material particulars and their properties.

In section 1.1 of this paper I describe the phenomenon of perceptual constancy and its impact on the debate about the structure of visual property-awareness. In sections 1.2 and 1.3, I critically discuss two stances on visual property-awareness that one might adopt in order to explain perceptual constancy. These early stances are, in effect, foils for the stance I propose and defend in sections 2.1-2.5. In these sections, I argue that visual property-awareness is a three-place relation between a subject, a property, and a manner of presentation. A key feature of my view is that manners of presentation mediate visual property-awareness without being objects of visual awareness themselves. This feature introduces mediating elements into our visual awareness of properties without distorting the evident phenomenological presence that properties have in our visual lives. I provide criteria of identity for manners of presentation (section 2.4), and I argue that our ignorance of their intrinsic nature does not compromise the viability of a theory that employs them (section 2.5). In section 3.1 I argue that the mediating elements I propose in this paper, manners of presentation, are consistent with key direct-realist contentions about the structure of visual awareness.

## 1.1

Before we begin, we need some working assumptions and restrictions. I assume that color, shape and size are genuinely perceptible properties. Color, shape, and size are given to us in experience. We can be visually aware of an object's color, size, or shape. Most philosophers agree on this point. I don't assume that these properties are the only

genuinely perceptible properties, but they do exhaust the range of my proposed theory. The three-place structure I propose below only applies to visual awareness of color, shape and size. A final preliminary point is that for much of the paper I will discuss cases in which a subject sees an object to have a perceptible property. In a later section (2.3), I briefly discuss some instances of property-awareness that don't seem to fit this description.

Color, shape, and size properties all exhibit perceptual constancy, the main feature of our experiences on which I will focus. Starting with color, color constancy is a familiar phenomenological aspect of our experiences.<sup>2</sup> In many cases, objects of perception seem (experientially) to remain the same in color, despite differences in the local perceptual context. For instance, as the lights begin to dim in a movie theater, the movie-goers in the seats around me do not appear to change in color. Or, if I'm outdoors playing golf, the grass does not appear to change in color as scattered clouds pass overhead. These examples focus on changes in lighting over time, but color constancy is also possible in cases of differential lighting across space. For instance, even if lights cast differing amounts of illumination on the surface of a table, we still see the table's surface to have a uniform color, if the difference in illumination is not too great. In these situations, we see the objects to be the same color; or, in alternate terms, we see the objects' colors *as constant*.

Although differences in illumination often do not prevent us from seeing an object's color as constant, these differences do have an impact on the phenomenal character of our experiences. More specifically, they have an impact on the color aspect

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<sup>2</sup> Other recent philosophical discussions of color constancy include Kelly 1999, 2001, 2005; Shoemaker 2000, Tye 2000, Noë 2005.

of the phenomenal character of experience, on what I will call “the color character of experience.” I will give some examples of this sort of impact, which should also help clarify the notion of color character. Suppose you take a look at your coat. If the lights dim as you look at your coat, the color character of your experiences will change. The coat will have a slightly darker look or appearance, even if you still see it to be the same color. Returning to the earlier movie theater example, the color character of my visual experiences changes as the lights go down in the theater. The seats and fellow movie-goers take on a darker look. But, before the theater becomes too dark, the seats and fellow movie-goers don’t seem to change in color.

A similar, familiar example concerns our visual awareness of size. As you see a friend approaching you on a campus walk, your friend does not appear to grow in size. Nonetheless, there is some loose sense in which your friend “gets bigger” as he approaches you. Your experiences of your friend involve differences in size appearance, without a difference in the size your friend appears to be. This is a case of size constancy. Turning to experience of shapes, a coin may continue to look round to a subject even while he induces differences in the shape character of his experiences by rotating the coin in his fingers. Perceptual constancy is a widely occurring feature of our experiences. In the remainder of the paper I focus on color constancy in order to keep our discussion manageable. I assume that an attractive treatment of color constancy provides some motivation for structurally similar treatments of shape and size constancy.

Color constancy is a perceptual phenomenon, residing in how objects appear to subjects in different perceptual contexts, in the perceptual basis of our beliefs about objects’ colors, not in the beliefs themselves. There is broad philosophical agreement on

this point.<sup>3</sup> Philosophers of color constancy analyze the phenomenon in terms of the *structure of experience*, rather than in terms of some mix of experience and belief; in this paper I follow this convention.

The “structure” of experience in question is its mental structure, its structure as a mental state.<sup>4</sup> There is potential for ambiguity here. On many theories, experiences have some or all of their mental properties only in virtue of their causal, historical, or teleological relations to external objects and properties.<sup>5</sup> These theories hold, in my terms, that the mental structure of experience is at least partly extrinsic to it. In this paper I want to focus precisely on the mental structure of experience, bracketing the issue of whether this structure is extrinsic. With this issue to one side, I will simply write of “the structure of experience.”

In a case of color constancy, a subject (i) sees an object’s color as constant, despite (ii) differences in the color character of his experiences of the object. I take much of the philosophical interest of color constancy to lie in the combination of these two conditions.<sup>6</sup> Although I sometimes talk of “looks” and “appearances” in this paper, this talk is always translatable into talk about phenomenal character.

I assume that subjects’ experiences change with the differences in color character that are partly definitive of color constancy. Subjects have experiences of different types in episodes of color constancy. As a subject cycles through different experiences in a case

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<sup>3</sup> See the papers I cite in note 2; see also Merleau-Ponty 1962, pt. II, section 3.

<sup>4</sup> For different views of the structure of experience so considered, see note 1.

<sup>5</sup> See, e.g., Dretske 1995, Tye 1995, 2000.

<sup>6</sup> Thus, while differences in illumination, and more broadly differences in one’s perceptual context, are part of the intuitive and scientific understanding of color constancy, they are not crucial to my specific focus in this paper. I describe this focus a bit more in the next few paragraphs in the main text.

of color constancy, he sees the object of his experiences as the same in color. What is the structure of his experiences?

I'm interested in this question because I want an explanation of the various features that makes color constancy philosophically interesting. I need to be clear about the sort of explanation I am looking for. In one sense, the lighting conditions do a good job of explaining the differences in color character that are partly definitive of color constancy. Color character varies as a function of the lighting conditions. I don't contest this but it is not the sort of explanation I am after. I'm interested in the structure of our experiences when we see objects to have constant colors: interested in what we are aware of in these cases, and interested in other structural features that our experiences might have. We don't resolve these issues by invoking the lighting conditions. Although lighting conditions are part of a good explanation of *how we end up having* the relevant experiences, they don't tell us anything about the structure of the experiences themselves.

Philosophers of perception look to the structure of experience to explain its phenomenal character. Sense-datum theorists, contemporary representationalists, and qualia theorists all explain the phenomenal character of experience in terms of the structure of experience and the elements that fill out this structure. For instance, the sense-datum theory holds that the phenomenal character of experience is determined by the nature of the sense data to which experience allegedly relates us. Differences in the phenomenal character of a subject's are explained by differences in the nature of the sense-data to which the subject is related. This is one application of the widespread

strategy of explaining phenomenal character in terms of the underlying structure of experience.<sup>7</sup>

Color constancy is an important item on the agenda of the philosophy of perception. We should expect theories of the structure of experience to explain (i) the differences in phenomenal character that partly characterize color constancy; and to explain (ii) subjects' awareness of objects' colors as constant, despite the differences in phenomenal character. The structure of experience must be complex enough to explain the differences in phenomenal character, while also explaining why the subject sees the object's color as constant.

In the next two sections of the paper I critically discuss two views about the structure of experience, in a buildup to the view I recommend. Although the first view does not seem to be a contender in the current debate about color constancy, it is nonetheless a good place to start. The second view is more popular. After introducing my own view in section 2.1, I critically discuss additional alternatives (section 2.2).

## 1.2

The first view of color experience is that, throughout the variations involved in cases of color constancy, we are simply aware of an object's color, and that's it. On this "minimal" view, the color aspect of any experience of an object's color is exhausted by a two-place relation to the object's color. A subject's diachronic experience of an object's color as constant, despite variations in the color character of the experience, is simply and entirely a persistent relation to the object's color.

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<sup>7</sup> The thinking behind the strategy is certainly worth clarifying, but here I will just adopt the strategy.

On this view, color constancy doesn't motivate any adjustment to the no-nonsense stance that in a color experience we are simply aware of some color. A proponent might argue as follows: "If we focus on color constancy as a lived phenomenon, we find we don't need an account of color awareness more complicated than the minimal view. In the great majority of our experiences, we do not notice the differences in phenomenal character that make color constancy a theoretically interesting phenomenon. We only notice the color itself. The differences that define color constancy make no difference in our ordinary experience of the world. Now, we are aware, often vividly, of differences in phenomenal character when we introspect our experiences. But, in this case, the introspective spotlight distorts the nature of ordinary experience. The vaunted differences in phenomenal character don't matter in ordinary experience. Complicated accounts of color awareness are unmotivated distortions of such ordinary experience."

There is a grain of truth in these remarks, to which we will return. But there are still problems with the minimal view of color awareness. One issue is how the view would handle cases in which the lighting conditions radically distort the appearance of an object's color, so that the object appears to be a different color from what it actually is. If we take one's experience in this sort of case to simply amount (in relevant part) to a relation to the object's color, we have a hard time explaining the color's distorted appearance.

A related objection attacks the above-stated phenomenological motivations of the view. Variations in phenomenal character do make a difference in ordinary experience, even if we do not notice or attend to them. Some philosophers recognize a difference

between attention and mere awareness.<sup>8</sup> Both are forms of awareness, but attention involves a greater degree of mental focus on the object of awareness. This distinction is relevant here. Suppose that I'm reading a book, and that the light from my lamp currently falls across only the top half of the book's facing pages. In this circumstance, I see the book's pages as the same in color. However, I will almost certainly move the book so that the pages more uniformly stand in the best light. Here I do not attend to the slight difference in appearance of the two pages; I just move the book. But in doing so, I react to my experiences of the book; more exactly, I react to phenomenal differences in my experiences. The minimal view of color awareness lacks the resources to explain these phenomenal differences. Accordingly it cannot make sense of my reaction. The phenomenal differences that partly characterize color constancy occasionally do make a difference in ordinary experience, but the minimal view of color awareness cannot account for these phenomenal differences.

### 1.3

Many philosophers recognize that the minimal view of color awareness outlined above isn't adequate. These philosophers offer more complex views, intended to better capture the phenomenology of experience. One currently popular approach holds that color experience involves not only awareness of colors, but awareness of other properties as well.<sup>9</sup> Proponents of this approach offer parallel treatments of visual awareness of shape and size, positing appropriate additional properties in each case. I will generically call

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<sup>8</sup> See Block 1995; see also Chalmers 1996, Eilan 1998, Martin 1998, Noë and O'Regan 2000, Campbell 2002 for related discussions. The authors cited here use different terminology in drawing the distinction between attention and mere awareness, and they do not draw the distinction in exactly the same way. But they show broad agreement on a rough distinction.

<sup>9</sup> See Shoemaker 2000, Tye 2000, pp. 78-79; Noë 2005. Earlier PDA-type views include Lycan 1996 and Tye 1996.

these new properties “appearance properties” or “a-properties.” On recent versions of the approach, objects can instantiate a-properties. I will call this second approach to property-awareness “the package-deal approach” or “PDA.” In this section I make a series of related objections to the package-deal approach.

As we have already discussed, color constancy is the phenomenon in which one sees an object to have a constant color despite variation in the color character of one’s experience of the object. PDA accounts for the “constant” dimension of color constancy in a straightforward fashion, in terms of the subject’s diachronic awareness of the object’s color. The other dimension of color constancy is the variation in the color character of one’s experience of the object. PDA accounts for this variation in color character in terms of the variation of the a-properties we see objects to have. PDA explains color constancy by making color awareness a two-level affair, in which we are simultaneously aware of colors and additional appearance properties.

My opening objection to PDA is that its analysis of color constancy is not isomorphic to the phenomenon itself. Cases of color constancy are not cases in which an object appears, across space or time, to *have* different properties. Rather, the object appears to have the same color property. On the face of it, color constancy does not involve variation in the properties an object appears to have. Here is an example. Suppose you are looking at a white wall, of which only the top half is in light shadow.<sup>10</sup> Call the respective parts of the wall “Top” and “Bottom.” As you look at the white wall, you see Top and Bottom as the same in color. But Top and Bottom also differ in look or appearance. This is the sort of color constancy situation we have been talking about.

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<sup>10</sup> Peacocke 1983 (chapter one) discusses a similar example, in the course of arguing that perceptual experiences have “sensational properties.” I discuss Peacocke’s position in section 2.2 of this paper.

According to PDA, when you look at the wall, you are aware of it as having three properties relevant to its color appearance: its color (whiteness), and the two different a-properties that give Top and Bottom their different appearances. However, the difference in appearance between Top and Bottom may not seem to be a difference in the wall itself. Although this is a delicate point, the difference between Top and Bottom does not strike me in this way, as a difference in the wall itself. When I look at a wall like the hypothetical wall described, I do experience its Top and Bottom as different in appearance. But I don't experience this difference as a difference in the properties of the wall. The wall doesn't seem to change as I move my gaze from Top to Bottom. The wall is the same color throughout, and I experience it as being the same color throughout. For this reason, it is a bit awkward to say that the wall itself seems different as I move my gaze from Top to Bottom. The wall seems to be the same, despite the fact that parts of it differ in appearance.

This observation is not supposed to be obvious, but I think it is an accurate description of what happens in cases of color constancy. PDA analyzes these cases in terms of the variation of properties in the objects themselves. This move is problematic because the objects themselves don't seem to be different. PDA locates the variation inherent in color constancy in the wrong place.

If there is a problem with PDA at a general level, then specific versions of PDA theories should run into trouble as well. If there is something wrong with PDA's overall approach, then the properties philosophers introduce as a-properties ought to be individually objectionable. Let's put this hypothesis to the test. Sydney Shoemaker introduces two kinds of appearance property in a recent version of the package-deal

approach to color constancy.<sup>11</sup> His proposal is part of an attempt to preserve representationalism about experience,<sup>12</sup> a theory that I describe and discuss in the next section. In this section I focus on the details of Shoemaker's proposal itself.

One kind of property proposed by Shoemaker are "occurrent appearance properties." Properties of this kind are properties of "causing, in a certain way, an experience of a certain sort" (Shoemaker 2000, p. 254). The other kind of appearance property for Shoemaker are "dispositional appearance properties," the kind of property an object has when it is "apt to produce experiences of a certain sort in some kinds of observers when those observers are related to it [the object] in a certain way" (ibid.). When one sees an object's color as constant, one is aware of the object's color, one is aware of different occurrent appearance properties manifested by the object, and one is also aware of the underlying dispositional grounds of the occurrent properties.<sup>13</sup> The different appearance properties (of both kinds) account for the differences in color character that make the case a case of color constancy.<sup>14</sup>

As against this proposal, I suggest that Shoemaker's appearance properties are too sophisticated to be genuinely perceptible. Shoemaker proposes, as an intuitive test for whether a property is genuinely perceptible, the criterion that experience itself put a subject in position to judge that objects of experience have that property (Shoemaker

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<sup>11</sup> Shoemaker 2000.

<sup>12</sup> Shoemaker 2000, p. 248.

<sup>13</sup> I take it that for Shoemaker the underlying dispositional grounds of occurrent appearance properties are not colors.

<sup>14</sup> The complexities of Shoemaker's theory lead him to introduce another type of property, namely "higher-order dispositional appearance properties" (see Shoemaker 2000, p. 257). These are properties, instantiable by material objects, of having a token of a broad type of dispositional appearance property. In Shoemaker's final proposal, these higher-order properties replace the original dispositional properties as objects of visual awareness. The revision does not affect the issues I discuss in the main text.

2000, p. 257). This is a rough criterion, but it should be adequate for present purposes. In order to judge that a given object has an occurrent appearance property, one must have the capacities to think about causation, about experience, and about kinds of experience (kinds individuated by their phenomenal character). The predication, in judgment, of dispositional appearance properties requires additional cognitive capacities, including the capacities to think about dispositions, about kinds of perceptual observers, and about ways those observers can be related to objects of experience. These are fairly sophisticated cognitive capacities. It is doubtful that perceptual experience provides us with the capacities to make judgments involving Shoemaker's appearance properties.<sup>15</sup>

Shoemaker disagrees, claiming that his properties meet the above perceptibility criterion. He contrasts them on this score with the property of being a hydrogen atom (Shoemaker 2000, p. 257). But this latter property seems closer to Shoemaker's on an intuitive sophistication continuum than Shoemaker acknowledges. There is, in any case, evident distance between perceptible properties like color, shape, and size and

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<sup>15</sup> I have tried to state this objection in a way that immunizes it from a likely response that invokes the notion of nonconceptual content (cf. the version of PDA in Tye 2000). In my terms, proponents of (one sort of) nonconceptual content hold that possessing precise concepts of a given range of objects and properties is not a necessary element of being experientially aware of these objects and properties. The debate about nonconceptual content is sharpest when concept possession is taken to be a substantial condition, as it is in McDowell 1994's influential discussion of concept possession and the content of experience. If nonconceptualism is correct, then one can experience objects and properties without possessing precise, corresponding concepts of these items—more exactly, without such concept possession being an essential aspect of the relevant experiences.

Nonconceptualism seeks to minimize the cognitive capacities necessary for having experiences. But, in doing so, nonconceptualism addresses issues separate from those raised by Shoemaker's criterion for perceptible properties. Nonconceptualism does not engage the question of which objects and properties experience enables us to make judgments about. Putting the same point in different terms, the issue of which concepts experience makes available to us for use in judgment survives even if certain types of concept possession are not essential aspects of experience itself. Invoking and defending nonconceptualism about experience does not displace Shoemaker's criterion, nor does it undermine the objection to Shoemaker that I base on this criterion.

Shoemaker's appearance properties on such a continuum. This distance compromises the idea that Shoemaker's properties are perceptible. However, as noted earlier, color constancy is a perceptual phenomenon. If Shoemaker's appearance properties aren't perceptible, they don't help us explain color constancy.

Are there perceptible properties that would help PDA? Shoemaker's properties are too sophisticated, but problems emerge if we try to press less sophisticated properties into service. The standard "unsophisticated" properties in this context are again properties like color, shape, and size; this status is earned partly on the grounds that animals and infants are able to perceive these properties. Color, shape, and size have a further relevant feature: they are phenomenologically evident to us in our experiences. They just seem to be presented to us. However, any property proposed by PDA is, *ex hypothesi*, not phenomenologically evident to us in our experiences: if it were so evident, it would not need to be philosophically proposed as an object of visual awareness. PDA is committed to a certain amount of phenomenological implausibility.

Further, any property proposed by PDA had better not itself exhibit perceptual constancy. That would trigger an ungainly and phenomenologically implausible hierarchy of a-properties. At this point PDA may begin to look ad hoc. It requires perceptible properties that are not phenomenologically evident, and that do not exhibit perceptual constancy, a phenomenon displayed by paradigmatic perceptible properties. PDA cuts against what we might call the logic of our experiences in a way that suggests that another approach to perceptual constancy is needed.

## 2.1

We saw in section 1.2 that the minimal view of color awareness tries to explain color constancy simply in terms of our awareness of color properties themselves. And we saw in section 1.3 that PDA's tactic is to introduce more properties as objects of awareness. I suggest that while we need something besides the colors in our account of the structure of color awareness, we don't need more properties or objects of awareness. What we need are visual manners of presentation.<sup>16</sup>

I take a subject's visual awareness of a color to have the following structure:

sVA: mpC

“s” is the experiencing subject; “VA” is the visual awareness relation. “mp” is a manner of presentation, and “c” is a color. Visual color awareness is a three-term relation between a subject, a color, and a manner of presentation. The manner of presentation is not an object of visual awareness (I will return to this point). These claims, and parallel claims about visual awareness of shape and size, define what I will call the manners of presentation approach (“MPA”) to visual property-awareness. I will discuss the above bit of formalism in more detail below.

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<sup>16</sup> The term is adapted from Peacocke 1989, with obvious earlier roots in Frege. See section 2.2 for discussion of both figures. In a series of papers on perceptual experience, Peacocke advocates “ways of perceiving,” entities that play an explanatory role similar to the one I envision for manners of presentation (see Peacocke 1989, 1998, 2001a, 2001b). However, Peacocke's ways of perceiving do not have quite the same role as the manners of presentation advocated in this paper, for they are not the only kind of entity that Peacocke introduces to help account for the phenomenal character of experience. In his 2001b, Peacocke briefly notes that he still holds that sensational properties are elements of experience. This aspect of Peacocke's view, introduced in Peacocke 1983, is discussed and rejected in section 2.2 of this paper. I advocate a more economical account of the structure of experience, and so I advocate a broader explanatory role for manners of presentation, as described in this paper, than the role Peacocke attributes to his ways of perceiving.

MPA explains color constancy in terms of differences in manners of presentation, introduced entities whose operation affects the phenomenal character of our experiences. Recall our white wall, the Top part of which is in shadow, while the Bottom part is not. When you look at this wall, you are visually aware of the wall as being uniformly white. But suppose we isolate your experience of Top from your experience of Bottom. According to MPA, in these sub-experiences you are aware of whiteness under different manners of presentation. The different manners of presentation account for the difference in appearance between Top and Bottom.<sup>17</sup>

Manners of presentation are not properties, and they are not objects of visual awareness. Although these tenets only partly illuminate the nature of manners of presentation, they do afford a number of interrelated explanatory advantages. When a subject sees an object's color as constant, the only property involved in this transaction is the color itself. I analyze the transaction in terms of the subject's continued awareness of the object's color under different manners of presentation. The subject sees the object to have one property; my analysis only refers to one property. This isomorphism is, I think, an attractive feature of MPA.

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<sup>17</sup> Although I focus on color awareness in this paper, I want to give some idea of how MPA handles visual awareness of shape and size. Consider size first, and return to the example from section 1.1, in which you see a friend approaching you on a campus walk. Although your friend does not appear to grow in size, there is some loose sense in which he "gets bigger" as he approaches you. There are differences in the "size character" of your experiences without a difference in the size your friend appears to be. According to MPA, you are aware of your friend's size throughout the entire perceptual episode, but you are aware of it under different manners of presentation as he gets closer to you. The different manners explain the differences in the size character of your experiences. Turning to shape, suppose I perceive a quarter as I rotate it with my fingers. According to MPA, I'm aware of the quarter's shape under different manners of presentation as I flip it around. The different manners of presentation explain the different looks of the quarter as I flip it around.

Manners are elements of the visual awareness relation, but they are not objects of visual awareness. In the modest formalism offered above, I put the “mp” in subscripts in an attempt to capture the tenet that manners themselves are not objects of visual awareness. Manners of presentation are integral off-stage elements of the visual awareness relation. We are visually aware of their effects, but we are not visually aware of manners themselves. As a result, manners of presentation are not open to the objection that they are not genuinely perceptible. We don’t need to convince anyone that they are.

MPA and the PDA theory of section 1.3 are competing accounts of the structure of visual color awareness. Both introduce entities intended to help explain color constancy. But PDA’s new entities, appearance properties, are objects of visual awareness, and MPA’s, explicitly, are not.

As noted in the last section, Shoemaker introduces PDA in an attempt to preserve representationalism about perceptual experience.<sup>18</sup> I take representationalism to endorse two tenets: (i) that experience consists in the representation of objects, properties, and/or propositions; and (ii) that such representation determines the phenomenal character of experience.<sup>19</sup> On a roughly “Russellian” conception of representation, this phenomenon consists in the simple, unmediated awareness of objects and properties, and the simple, unmediated entertaining of propositional complexes of these items. PDA analyzes color constancy in terms of Russellian property-awareness. PDA is, in the hands of Shoemaker and others, an attempt to explain the phenomenon of color constancy in Russellian representationalist terms. Further, PDA seems to be the best Russellian representationalist

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<sup>18</sup> Tye (2000)’s version of PDA has a similar motivation.

<sup>19</sup> See Dretske 1995, Tye 1995, 2000.

theory of color constancy.<sup>20</sup> Thus, PDA's difficulties, as brought out in the last section, are problems for Russellian representationalism about perceptual experience.

But these problems do not affect representationalism itself. Someone who is attracted to the basic representationalist ideas—(i) and (ii)—can reject Russellianism as I describe it above, and adopt a different notion of representation. With such a notion in hand, PDA is no longer mandatory for a representationalist.

In fact, MPA's manners of presentation may be appealing to non-Russellian representationalists. Manners of presentation differ from the entities that embody the antithesis of the representationalist mindset. Manners of presentation are not sense data, and they are quite distinct from the qualia-like “sensational properties” advocated by Christopher Peacocke (1983), and discussed in the next section.<sup>21</sup> Although my own sympathies are with the direct realism that I discuss in section 3.1, I want to emphasize the possibility of accord between MPA and some versions of representationalism.

Returning to MPA itself, I intend my earlier “off-stage” metaphor to capture more than the idea that we are not visually aware of manners of presentation. Manners of presentation are not available at the subjective level of experience in any way at all. I elaborate this claim and its importance in the next section's discussion of Peacocke's theory of sensational properties. Outside of the discussion of Peacocke, however, the idea that manners of presentation are not objects of visual awareness will be enough to communicate the substance of MPA.

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<sup>20</sup> Another option for Russellian representationalism is the minimal view of color awareness described in section 1.2 of this paper, but I assume that this option is unattractive.

<sup>21</sup> Sydney Shoemaker (2000) is a partial dissenter to the representationalist mindset I describe in the main text. He advocates both representationalism and qualia. However, Shoemaker acknowledges the unconventional character of his view (p. 248), and he registers his opposition to sense data (p. 272).

In the next four sections, I locate MPA with respect to important predecessors, (2.2), describe MPA's theoretical scope (2.3), provide criteria of identity for manners of presentation (2.4), and discuss the issue of their intrinsic nature (2.5).

## 2.2

In this section I distinguish MPA from neighboring views advocated by Frege and Christopher Peacocke. Starting with Frege, we have to distinguish MPA's use of the notion of a manner of presentation from the more familiar Fregean one. (MPA is a non-Russellian theory of color awareness, but it also has important non-Fregean aspects). In his seminal work, Frege employs the notion of a manner of presentation, no doubt in part because the notion is pre-theoretically comprehensible. I find the notion appealing for the same reason, but I put it to different theoretical use. In this section's discussion of Frege, I rely on a conventional understanding of him, without taking a stand on the historical accuracy of this understanding. When bringing out important features of MPA, it may be more useful to compare the theory to a conventional Frege than to the historical Frege.

In an attempt to explain well-known puzzles involving belief reports and identity statements, Frege holds that the objects of belief are modes of presentation or senses. These entities are many-one with respect to the objects and properties they determine; this point enables a familiar form of explanation of the problem cases. Shifting to the philosophy of perception, MPA holds that manners of presentation are many-one with respect to the properties they present; this point enables the explanations of color constancy and other perceptual phenomena sketched in the last section. At a high level of generality, Frege and MPA apply the same style of explanation to different intentional

phenomena. When we look more closely, however, important differences between the two theoretical approaches emerge.

First, experiential manners of presentation are not objects of visual awareness. In contrast, as noted above, Fregean senses are the objects of belief. MPA holds that manners of presentation are *elements* of the visual awareness relation, it doesn't hold that such manners are the intentional objects of this relation. Although both Frege and MPA introduce new entities as elements of their respective target relations (belief, visual color awareness), only Frege holds that the new entities are the sole objects of his target relation. In fact, the structural disparity between the views goes deeper, since MPA contends that manners of presentation are not objects of visual awareness at all.

Second, experiential manners of presentation do not determine reference. That is to say, the manner of presentation ingredient in a given token color experience does not fix the color that is the object of awareness in the experience. This tenet contrasts with Frege's doctrine that linguistic expressions with the same sense must have the same reference. On my view, two experiences that have the same manner of presentation as a constituent can involve awareness of different colors. An experiential manner of presentation can present different colors in different token experiences.

Claims about color awareness parallel to Frege's views on belief and linguistic reference are unattractive. Consider first the view that manners of presentation, not colors, are the primary objects of color awareness. Let's call this the "Frege-isomorphic" view of color awareness. The thought might be that we are visually aware of manners,

which go on to determine colors as secondary or derivative objects of awareness.

Currently there is some interest in views of this kind.<sup>22</sup>

Mass conversion, however, would be unwise. If we take a closer look, it should be clear that the Frege-isomorphic view of color awareness is simply another version of indirect realism. The main challenge to it parallels the main challenge to indirect realism itself. Our awareness of colors does not seem to depend on our awareness of anything else. When I open my eyes the colors are simply there; they do not seem to be secondary objects of awareness. I can't isolate the other things on which my awareness of the colors is supposed to depend. The Frege-isomorphic view clashes with the character of experience, as we might expect from the view's fundamentally indirect-realist structure.

A related point is that introducing manners of presentation as objects of awareness would be an overreaction to color constancy. This phenomenon indicates that the color character of experience varies independently of the colors of which we are aware. Colors, as objects of awareness, can't account for all the features of our color experiences. Colors need some help. However, colors nonetheless have a vivid primacy in our visual experiences, a primacy which extends to cases of color constancy. In the vast majority of cases in which we see an object's color as constant, we are, at best, only dimly aware of differences in the color character of our experiences. This was the grain of truth in the earlier argument (section 1.1) for the minimal view of color awareness. Colors need some help in accounting for the color character of our experiences, but this help shouldn't

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<sup>22</sup> David Chalmers, in his 2004, advocates a view similar to the one I sketch above. In the 2004 paper, Chalmers attempts to neutralize phenomenological objections to his view much like the one I press in the next paragraph in the main text. However, in a more recent paper (Chalmers forthcoming), Chalmers acknowledges the force of such objections and revises his view of experience in response to them. Discussion of Chalmers's complex and evolving views is outside the scope of this paper.

dislodge colors from their central place in our visual lives. MPA is an effort to strike the right balance.

As noted above, Frege holds that the senses of linguistic expressions determine the referents of these expressions. Two expressions with the same sense cannot differ in their referents. The analogous position on color experience is that the manner of presentation partly constitutive of a given color experience determines the color that one is aware of in the experience.<sup>23</sup> This position should be rejected. Assigning a color-determining role to manners of presentation has the odd consequence that colors are derivative ingredients of token color experiences. I find this consequence to be disqualifying, but in any case there is a more expansive way of bringing out the problem. The thesis that manners determine colors as objects of awareness gives manners of presentation priority over colors in the explanation of the phenomenal character of color experience. This priority is unacceptable, since it flouts the idea that colors have a central place in our visual lives.

MPA's structural differences with the just-outlined Fregean alternatives reflect an attempt to preserve the central place of the colors, and more generally to offer a phenomenologically accurate theory of experience. These goals also motivate the differences between MPA and Christopher Peacocke's (1983) theory of perceptual experience, on which experience has "sensational properties."

Peacocke offers this theory in response to phenomenological aspects of our experiences much like the ones we have been considering in this paper (see Peacocke 1983, chapter one). Sensational properties are "non-representational," in that they are not

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<sup>23</sup> This position is available even if we reject the idea that manners of presentation are objects of visual awareness.

determined by the representational content of experience. But this independence is mutual, since, equally, sensational properties do not determine the representational content of experience (Peacocke 1983, p. 23). The latter point is somewhat similar to MPA's position that the manner of presentation ingredient in a token color experience does not determine the color that a subject is aware of in the experience. Also, as properties of experience, sensational properties are not intentional objects of experience. This is another point in common with MPA, whose explanatory entities, manners of presentation, are not objects of awareness.

But the main difference with Peacocke's view is that sensational properties, unlike manners of presentation, are available at the subjective level of experience. Although sensational properties may not be intentional objects of experience in a strict sense—remember, they are properties of experience—they are nonetheless presented to an experiencing subject. Sensational properties are phenomenally salient properties of regions of subjects' visual fields (Peacocke 1983, pp. 20-21). The idea that they are available to experiencing subjects seems to be a consequence of this position. Peacocke describes at least one sensational property, white', as "familiar" (p. 20), which again suggests that sensational properties are subjectively available.

In conjunction with other tenets, the subjective availability of sensational properties raises the specter of a veil of perception. The sensational properties of a token experience make an autonomous contribution to the phenomenal character of the experience, a contribution not determined by the experience's representational content. Further, sensational properties seem to have a pervasive presence to subjects in experience: once we adopt Peacocke's theoretical perspective, it is hard to imagine

regions of the visual field that lack sensational properties. (Peacocke does not argue that such regions are possible). Peacocke's theory of sensational properties suggests a veil of perception because it posits subjectively available, autonomous, pervasive, phenomenally salient properties of experience—properties that, as Peacocke emphasizes, are not colors, shapes, and sizes (pp. 20-21).

In this context, a good synonym for “pervasive” is “monopoly-possessing.” Veils of perception are objectionable because they impose a distinct subject matter between perceivers and the apparent objects of perceptual attention, worldly items and their properties. With the distinct subject matter in place, the idea that we are also aware of property-bearing worldly items becomes problematic, since experience seems to present only a single, homogenous subject matter for our attention.

By contrast with Peacocke's view, MPA does not even suggest a veil of perception. According to MPA, the only items available at the subjective level in color experience are the colors. Again, manners of presentation are “off-stage” or “below the deck” constituents of experience. They have an effect on the appearances of things available at the subjective level, but manners of presentation are not to be found at this level. Thus they are entirely out of the way.

### 2.3

According to MPA, color awareness always involves manners of presentation. Although color constancy shows us that colors need some help in accounting for the color character of experience, it would be a mistake to think that manners of presentation are operative only in cases where the lighting conditions are bad, or in cases where the phenomenon of color constancy breaks down (where we don't see an object as the same in color).

Favorable conditions are not inert ones. Good lighting creates circumstances in which the color can be seen at its best.<sup>24</sup> We need manners of presentation in “good” cases as well as “bad” ones.

We need manners of presentation even in cases of visual color awareness that don’t involve objects. Suppose that I look at the blue sky, or that I’m engulfed in one of the celebrated Ganzfeld fogs.<sup>25</sup> These cases are not happily described as situations in which I’m aware of an object and its color. It isn’t clear that there are any objects involved. But it would be arbitrary to hold that in these cases I’m aware of colors themselves, unaffected by manners of presentation. There is no way to argue that objects corrupt the appearances of colors, and that the sky and Ganzfeld fogs truly reveal them. Being aware of a blue sky and being aware of blueness in a Ganzfeld fog are just two more ways of being aware of blueness. There isn’t anything special about them.

This point is bolstered by the plausible assumption that color constancy effects are possible in Ganzfeld cases. The blue as it is presented to me in a Ganzfeld fog could seem a bit thicker or smoother while still appearing to be the same color. In this sort of case, the color character of my experience changes, but I still seem to be aware of the same color. One’s experience in a color-constancy Ganzfeld-case would have a significant phenomenological similarity to one’s experience of an *object’s* color as constant. Although objects are present in one case but not the other, the phenomenological

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<sup>24</sup> For discussion of this point, although not in the context of manners of presentation, see Kelly 2005.

<sup>25</sup> A Ganzfeld is an induced or naturally occurring situation in which a subject is visually aware of an undifferentiated, uniform field of color. Examples of naturally occurring Ganzfelds might include being in a very dense fog, or being in pitch-darkness. For recent discussion of the pitch dark, see Sorensen 2004 and Johnston 2004, p. 141.

similarity of the cases indicates other structural parallels. We need manners of presentation even in cases when we are not aware of objects.<sup>26</sup>

When we experience a color, it can shift in appearance while still appearing to be the same color. Colors, as objects of awareness, do not determine the color-relevant phenomenal aspects of experience. We need to introduce something besides the colors into the structure of color awareness: I propose manners of presentation. These entities are not objects of visual awareness; thus colors are not uprooted from their central place in our visual lives. But manners of presentation fill a needed functional role. Their inclusion in the visual awareness relation explains the differences in color character that partly define color constancy. Manners of presentation, in conjunction with the colors, determine the color-relevant phenomenal aspects of our experiences.<sup>27</sup>

## 2.4

The phenomenal character of one's experience of a color changes as one is aware of the color under different manners of presentation. Manners of presentation must be individuated in a way that allows them to have this effect. Simply put, a color can't

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<sup>26</sup> If my remarks about Ganzfeld cases and color constancy are on the right track, then the definition of color constancy offered earlier in this paper (section 1.1) needs revision. If color constancy effects are possible in Ganzfeld cases and in similar cases, and if subjects in these cases are not aware of any objects, then my definition of color constancy in terms of seeing an *object's* color as constant needs to be broadened to something like the following: in color constancy, one is visually aware of a color as constant, despite differences in the color character of one's experience.

<sup>27</sup> My discussion of the determination of phenomenal character is limited to the phenomenal character of one perceptual modality: vision. My claim is that within the visual modality, color character is fixed by manners of presentation and the colors of which we are visually aware. Differences in color character are due to differences in the colors and manners ingredient in the relevant visual experiences (see also the discussion in section 2.4).

Mine is an "intra-modal" claim about the basis of visual phenomenal character. That is, I help myself to the distinctive phenomenology of vision, and make a claim about the basis of differences in this phenomenology from one visual experience to another. Proposals about the determination of phenomenal character that *don't* help themselves to the phenomenology of given perceptual modalities make "cross-modal" claims about the determination of phenomenal character. For discussion of proposals with this scope, see Byrne 2001, O'Dea forthcoming.

appear differently to a subject on two occasions if in both cases the subject is aware of the color under the same manner of presentation. If, in two token experiences, a subject is aware of the same color under the same manner of presentation, then that color must not discriminably differ in appearance to him. No token of what I will call “color-manner pairs” (a color appearing to a subject under a manner of presentation) can produce discriminably different color appearances. Equivalently, experiences involving the same color-manner pairs must be indiscriminable with respect to their color character. If this were not the case, manners of presentation would not be the key to the differences in color character that partly characterize color constancy.

The following criteria of identity should do the trick. They are more compactly stated in terms of color appearances, rather than in terms of color character. The former notion should suffice to communicate the basic idea. “mp’s” are manners of presentation, and “c’s” are colors.

(M)  $mp_1 = mp_2$  if and only if

- (i) For all  $c$ ,  $mp_1c$  is indiscriminable with respect to color appearance from  $mp_2c$ ;
- (ii) For all  $c$ , there is no  $x$  and no  $mp_3$  such that  $x$  is a color and  $mp_3x$  is indiscriminable with respect to color appearance from  $mp_1c$  but discriminable with respect to color appearance from  $mp_2c$ .

A few terminological comments must precede more substantive discussion of (M).

“Discriminability” and its variants are undefined in (M). Discriminability is a useful

notion in this context even if we don't try to nail it down. Also, in (M), I don't put the "mp's" in subscripts, in order to enhance readability.

Condition (i) ensures that a color presented twice under the same manner does not discriminably differ in its appearance. As noted above, individuating manners in this way enables them to serve as the basis of differences in color appearance in cases of color constancy. If a color discriminably differs in appearance on two occasions, then we know, from (i), that different manners must present the color on the respective occasions. If discriminable differences in a color's appearance co-vary with differences in manners of presentation, then it is plausible that the latter explain the former.

Condition (ii) does the dirty work that accrues when one uses indiscriminability as a criterion of identity. Identity is transitive, but indiscriminability often isn't. The pair  $mp_1c$  could be indiscriminable with respect to color appearance from the pair  $mp_2c$ , and yet there might be a further manner of presentation  $mp_3$  such that  $mp_3c$  was discriminable from one of the former pairs but not the other. This would be a clue that  $mp_1$  and  $mp_2$  are non-identical. It is also a clue that condition (i) is only a necessary, not sufficient, criterion of identity for manners of presentation. Identical manners must not only produce indiscriminable color appearances when they present the same color, they must also *match*: that is, it must be impossible to make another manner-color pair (using any color) that is indiscriminable from one but not the other.<sup>28</sup> Condition (ii) is the matching condition.<sup>29</sup>

My method for individuating manners of presentation allows them to present different colors. As noted in section 2.2, a color experience's manner of presentation does

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<sup>28</sup> My use of the plural here is, of course, an expository pretense.

<sup>29</sup> The notion of matching is from Peacocke 1989, which draws on Goodman 1966's discussion of qualia.

not determine the color of which one is aware in the experience. Manners of presentation are not tied to individual colors. In addition, manners of presentation are not tied to specific color appearances or color characters. The color character of an experience depends on both the color and manner of presentation involved in the experience.

## 2.5

But what *are* manners of presentation?, one might ask. My admittedly underwhelming answer is that they are things that play a certain functional role, the functional role described in the last few sections. Manners of presentation are responsible for the differences in color character that partly characterize color constancy, as a product of their contribution to the color character of experience in general.

I do not, then, offer an intrinsic characterization of manners of presentation. MPA tells us that there are manners of presentation; it tells us what manners of presentation *do*; but it does not tell us what they intrinsically are. The question naturally arises whether this omission prevents MPA from being an acceptable theory of the structure of visual awareness of color, and of shape and size as well.<sup>30</sup>

We need to get clear on exactly what the omission amounts to. MPA does not claim that there are entities that play the manner-of-presentation role *while lacking* intrinsic natures, or while lacking natures explicable in non-functional terms. The noteworthy thing about MPA is not that it introduces entities that lack intrinsic natures.

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<sup>30</sup> This section responds to Stephen Schiffer's discussion in his 1990, 1992. Schiffer argues that a theory that posits modes of presentation must offer an intrinsic characterization of these modes in order to be viable. It will develop in this section that I largely disagree with Schiffer about the relevant theoretical burden. I argue that the absence of an intrinsic characterization does not defeat MPA, but I concede that MPA's silence about the intrinsic nature of manners of presentation creates more mundane dialectical problems.

Rather MPA claims that some entities play a certain functional role, and it claims this without providing an intrinsic characterization of these entities.

I don't think this is a crippling defect. To begin with, the omission has at least a partial explanation. We aren't visually aware of manners of presentation, and this inhibits our ability to know their intrinsic properties. In previous sections, I argued against introducing novel objects of visual awareness, distinct from colors, to account for color constancy. My arguments push theories of color constancy to posit entities beyond the reach of one main source of knowledge of intrinsic properties, visual awareness.

I don't claim that "intrinsic knowledge" of manners of presentation is simply impossible, but what I want to emphasize here is that the viability of MPA is not hostage to our discovering the intrinsic nature of manners of presentation. Many philosophers explain the phenomenal character of experience in terms of what I have been calling the structure of experience. This practice involves commitment to the existence of a certain functional role: the role of explaining the phenomenal aspects of color constancy. The practice also involves a commitment to filling this role with elements of the structure of experience. Once we are comfortable enough with these commitments, one way to reasonably arrive at MPA is to argue against other ways of fulfilling the commitments. This has been my course of action in this paper. I argued against the minimal view of color awareness, against PDA, against views that parallel Frege's views on belief and linguistic reference, and against Peacocke's theory of sensational properties. Although I have not discussed every variant of every opposing theory, I have tried to put a reasonable case for MPA in place.

This case would admittedly be enhanced by more information about what manners of presentation are. In the absence of such information, philosophers may have doubts about the ontological approach to color constancy pursued throughout this paper, or search for things of which we have intrinsic knowledge that can play the manner-of-presentation role. I don't encourage these reactions, but they are fair and potentially productive.

Another worry about manners of presentation is that their unknown nature seems to limit the explanatory power of MPA. Some limitation must be conceded, but MPA is not rendered vacuous by our ignorance of the intrinsic nature of manners of presentation. A theory can be an explanatory advance even if leaves us without complete intrinsic knowledge of its subject matter. MPA offers an improved understanding of the structure of visual awareness: we may not know what manners of presentation are, but at least we know what they do and where they fit into the visual awareness relation. Our ignorance of the intrinsic natures of manners of presentation is not a decisive objection to MPA. While the speculative nature of the theory should not be underestimated, there is nonetheless a reasonable case for its acceptance.

### 3.1

I turn now to the question of MPA's compatibility with direct realism. MPA introduces some mediation into our visual awareness of properties. For this reason it is obviously incompatible with theories that claim that such awareness is wholly unmediated. MPA conflicts with a generic sort of direct realism. However, some versions of direct realism are multi-layered in a way that is not easily condensed into a simple slogan. The relationship between MPA and the latter views is not one of straightforward, or even

predominant, opposition. In order to get a better sense of this relationship, I will consider some key direct-realist claims.

One central claim is the rejection of *perceptual intermediaries*.<sup>31</sup> Direct realists uniformly reject the idea that we are visually aware of material particulars and their properties *by* being aware or *because* we are aware of distinct, intervening entities. The type of intermediary at issue is an object of awareness. Direct realists reject distinct, intervening objects of awareness, holding that material objects and their properties are the sole objects of veridical visual awareness. MPA is compatible with this tenet.<sup>32</sup> As I continue to stress, manners of presentation are not objects of visual awareness. An MPA adherent can agree with the direct realist about the objects of visual awareness.

Things are a little more complicated with respect to some other direct-realist tenets. In order to bring out these tenets, I turn to a fairly canonical statement of contemporary direct (or “naïve”) realism from Michael Martin:

According to naïve realism, the actual objects of perception, the external things such as trees, tables and rainbows, which one can perceive, and the properties which they can manifest to one when perceived, partly constitute one’s conscious experience, and hence determine the phenomenal character of one’s experience. This talk of constitution and determination should be taken literally; and a consequence of it is that one could not be having the very experience one has, were the objects perceived not to exist, or were they to lack the features they are perceived to have. Furthermore, it is of the essence of such states of mind that they are partly constituted by such objects, and their phenomenal characters are determined by those objects and their qualities. So one could not have such a type of state of mind were one not perceiving some object and correctly perceiving it to have the features it manifests itself as having (Martin 1997, pp. 83-84).

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<sup>31</sup> See, e.g., McDowell 1982, Martin 1997, 2004, Alston 1999, Putnam 2001, Johnston 2004.

<sup>32</sup> As we saw in the section 2.2 discussion of Christopher Peacocke’s “sensational-properties” view, MPA is also compatible with the tenet that external-world objects and properties are the only items present at the subjective level of veridical experience, a tenet that we can plausibly take to be part of direct realism.

I will focus on two main tenets that come out of Martin's passage. First, Martin claims that the phenomenal character of veridical experience is determined by the objects of such experience and their qualities. I will call this the Determination thesis.<sup>33</sup> We should be careful before declaring MPA to be either compatible or in conflict with Determination. MPA rejects the idea that an object and its color fully determine the color character of one's experience of the object. The lighting conditions and other factors make a difference in how the color appears, and MPA analyzes this influence in terms of the selection and operation of a manner of presentation of the color. According to MPA, objects and properties do not determine the phenomenal character of experience. Manners of presentation play a role as well. In this way MPA appears to conflict with Martin's Determination thesis.

It may be, however, that this thesis is not meant to express a filled-out view of the structure of experience. Most direct realists don't discuss color constancy at all, and for this reason we shouldn't necessarily interpret them as offering theories intended to respond to it. On another reading of Determination, the thesis only indicates opposition to intermediate objects of awareness and qualia. The fact that color constancy is simply not on the agenda in most discussions of direct realism might suggest that MPA's treatment of this phenomenon is compatible with contemporary versions of the theory.

Making a slight push for compatibility, MPA accepts Determination's guiding idea. MPA takes external properties to contribute to the phenomenal character of experience, diverging from Determination only in the tenet that objects of visual

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<sup>33</sup> For another recent direct-realist statement of this thesis, see Johnston 2004, p. 146. I take the Determination thesis to be an "intra-modal" claim about the phenomenal character of visual experience (see note 26 for an explanation of this terminology). Johnston, at least, may endorse more general claims about the determination of phenomenal character, but he does not explicitly discuss them.

awareness are not the exclusive determiners of phenomenal character.<sup>34</sup> But this last tenet, fortunately or not, undermines my compatibility campaign. With this tenet MPA departs not only from the letter of Martin's passage, but also from the spirit of the theory he describes. So we have to recognize a difference in doctrine between MPA and some contemporary versions of direct realism. These versions seem unable to explain color constancy, but I'm not interested in pursuing that line of discussion. Even if MPA has some direct-realist opponents, it still belongs in the direct-realist camp. The theory's opposition to intermediate objects of awareness makes it recognizable as a form of direct realism.

We get further evidence of MPA's direct-realist credentials if we turn to another claim from Martin's passage. Martin claims that material particulars and their properties are constituents of veridical experiences. Call this the Constitution thesis. This thesis does not conflict with MPA. MPA's claim that manners of presentation are constituents of experience (considered as a mental state) is compatible with Martin's Constitution claim that material particulars and their properties are constituents of veridical experience.<sup>35</sup> This point is further evidence of MPA's compatibility with main direct-realist ideas.

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<sup>34</sup> Although MPA departs from the Determination thesis about phenomenal character, it is not a qualia theory. Qualia are present at the subjective level of experience in a way that manners of presentation are not. Also, I take the qualia theorist to reject the view that our awareness of external properties is a factor in the phenomenal character of our experiences. He holds that qualia are the sole determiners of phenomenal character. In contrast, MPA holds that the color character of experience is the product of both colors and manners of presentation.

<sup>35</sup> Martin's Constitution claim distinguishes his direct realism from the representationalist views discussed earlier in the paper: representationalists typically reject the Constitution claim, especially as it applies to material objects. Martin's Constitution claim makes the objects and properties of which one is aware in veridical experiences intrinsic to the experiences themselves. His claim is one way of rejecting the idea, outlined in section 1.1, that the mental structure of experience is extrinsic to it. As I have described the theory here, MPA is compatible with both intrinsic and extrinsic approaches to the mental structure of experience.

#### 4.1

MPA holds that visual color awareness is a relation between a subject, a color, and a manner of presentation, in which only the color is an object of visual awareness. My main claim in this paper has been that MPA is the best theoretical fit with color constancy and other phenomenological aspects of our color experiences. I believe that MPA can be plausibly extended to size and shape experience, but of course more discussion is required to bring this out. MPA's claims about color experience could also stand more discussion. Important further topics include inverted-spectrum cases, illusions, and hallucinations. Here I have only tried to make MPA itself, and its basic phenomenological motivations, reasonably clear.\*

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